University of California, Davis -- Department of Economics

ECN 103 : ECONOMICS of UNCERTAINTY

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## Version 1 WINTER 2024 - FIRST MIDTERM EXAM

Answer all questions. If you don't explain (= show your work for) your answers you will get no credit.

NAME:\_\_\_\_\_\_ University ID:\_\_\_\_\_

- By writing your name on this exam you certify that you have not violated the University's Code of Academic Contact (for example, you have not copied from the work of another student and you have not knowingly facilitated cheating by another student).
- If you submit the exam without writing your name and ID, you will get a score of 0 • for this exam.
- If you do not stop writing when told so (at the end), a penalty of 10 points will be • deducted from your score.

- **1.** [55 points] Jim has an initial wealth of \$120,000 and faces the possibility of a loss in the amount of \$40,000. Let p be the probability of loss.
  - (a) Each of the following contracts is given in terms of two numbers (h, d), where *h* is the premium and *d* is the deductible: A = (7,000, 20,000), B = (8,200, 15,000), C = (6,000, 35,000). Re-write them in terms of  $(W_1, W_2)$ , where  $W_1$  is wealth in the bad state and  $W_2$  is wealth in the good state.

(**a.1**) [4 points] A =

(a.2) [4 points] B =

(a.3) [4 points] C =

(b) (b.1) [6 points] For what value of p do contracts A and B lie on the same isoprofit line?

(**b.2**) [6 points] What is the slope of an isoprofit line in the  $(W_1, W_2)$  plane for the value of *p* found in Pat (b.1)?

(c) [8 points] For the value of *p* found in Part (b), does contract *C* lie on a higher or lower isoprofit line in the  $(W_1, W_2)$  plane relative to the isoprofit line that goes through contract *B*? [No credit if you don't show your work.]

(d) [4 points] For a general value of *p*, what is the premium of the full-insurance contract that lies on the zero-profit line?

(e) Suppose that Jim's utility-of-wealth function is  $U(w) = \sqrt{w}$  and that the probability of loss is 30%. (e.1) [12 points] How does Jim rank the three contracts A, B and C?

(e.2) [7 points] If the choice was between contract C and no insurance, what would Jim choose?

- 2. [45 points] Gwen, who obeys the axioms of expected utility theory, is faced with four possible basic outcomes: *A*, *B*, *C* and *D*. Her ranking of these outcomes is  $A \succ B \succ C \succ D$ . Gwen is indifferent between the certainty of *B* and a lottery where there is a 25% probability of *A* and a 75% probability of *D*. She is also indifferent between the certainty of *C* and a lottery where there is a 20% probability of *B* and a 80% probability of *D*.
  - (a) [12 points] Construct a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that reflects these preferences and is such that the largest utility is 80 and the smallest utility is 20.

(**b**) [10 points] How does Gwen rank the lotteries  $L = \begin{pmatrix} A & C & D \\ \frac{1}{10} & \frac{2}{5} & \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix}$  and  $M = \begin{pmatrix} B & C \\ \frac{2}{5} & \frac{3}{5} \end{pmatrix}$ ?

(c) [10 points] For what value of p is Gwen indifferent between

$$L = \begin{pmatrix} A & C & D \\ \frac{1}{10} & \frac{2}{5} & \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix} \text{ and } \mathbf{N} = \begin{pmatrix} B & C \\ p & 1-p \end{pmatrix}?$$

(d) [13 points] Normalize the utility function of Part (a)