

FIRST MIDTERM EXAM: **ANSWERS for VERSION 1**

- 1.** (a) $A = (93,000, 113,000)$, $B = (96,800, 111,800)$, $C = (79,000, 114,000)$.
- (b) (b.1) We need $7,000 - p(40,000 - 20,000) = 8,200 - p(40,000 - 15,000)$, that is, $p = \frac{6}{25} = 0.24$.
- (b.2) The slope is $-\frac{\frac{6}{25}}{\frac{19}{25}} = -\frac{6}{19} = -0.31579$.
- (c) When $p = \frac{6}{25}$, the expected profit from B is 2,200 and the expected profit from C is $6,000 - \frac{6}{25}5,000 = 4,800$. Thus C lies on a **lower** isoprofit line (corresponding to higher profits) than the one that goes through contract B .
- (d) For zero profits with full insurance we need the premium to be equal to the expected loss: $h = p(40,000)$.
- (e) (e.1) $EU(A) = 0.3\sqrt{93,000} + 0.7\sqrt{113,000} = 326.79$,
 $EU(B) = 0.3\sqrt{96,800} + 0.7\sqrt{111,800} = 327.39$
 $EU(C) = 0.3\sqrt{79,000} + 0.7\sqrt{114,000} = 320.67$. Thus his ranking is $B \succ A \succ C$
- (e.2) The utility of No Insurance is $0.3\sqrt{80,000} + 0.7\sqrt{120,000} = 327.34$. Thus he would choose not to insure.

- 2.** (a) $U(A) = 80$ and $U(D) = 20$. Then the expected utility of $\left(\begin{smallmatrix} A & D \\ \frac{1}{4} & \frac{3}{4} \end{smallmatrix}\right)$ is $\frac{1}{4}80 + \frac{3}{4}20 = 35$. Hence $U(B) = 35$. Thus the expected utility of $\left(\begin{smallmatrix} B & D \\ \frac{1}{5} & \frac{4}{5} \end{smallmatrix}\right)$ is $\frac{1}{5}35 + \frac{4}{5}20 = 23$, so that $U(C) = 23$.
- (b) $\mathbb{E}[U(L)] = \frac{1}{10}80 + \frac{2}{5}23 + \frac{1}{2}20 = 27.2$ and $\mathbb{E}[U(M)] = \frac{2}{5}35 + \frac{3}{5}23 = 27.8$ thus she prefers M to L .
- (c) We need $35p + 23(1-p) = 27.2$. Thus $p = \frac{35}{100} = 35\%$.

- (d) Start from $\begin{matrix} A & B & C & D \\ 80 & 35 & 23 & 20 \end{matrix}$, subtract 20: $\begin{matrix} A & B & C & D \\ 60 & 15 & 3 & 0 \end{matrix}$ and finally divide by 60 to get
- $\begin{matrix} A & B & C & D \\ 1 & \frac{15}{60} = \frac{1}{4} & \frac{3}{60} = \frac{1}{20} & 0 \end{matrix}$.