$$
V(q)>u(q)
$$

What if there is asymmetric information: only the owner knows the quality $q$ ?
Publicly available information:

| Quality $q$ | best: $A$ | $B$ | $C$ | $D$ | $E$ | worst: $F$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Number of <br> cars | 120 | 200 | 100 | 240 | 320 | 140 | Total: <br> 1,120 |
| Proportion | $\frac{120}{1120}$ | $\frac{200}{1120}$ | $\frac{100}{1120}$ | $\frac{240}{1120}$ | $\frac{320}{1120}$ | $\frac{140}{420}$ |  |
| $v(q)$ (seller) | 720 | 630 | 540 | 450 | 360 | 270 |  |
| $u(q)$ (buyer) | 800 | 700 | 600 | 500 | 400 | 300 |  |

Buyer: if a car is offered to me at price $p$ should I buy it?

Buying a car at price p is playing the lottery

$$
\left(\begin{array}{ccccccccc}
\$(800-p) & \$(700-p) & \$(600-p) & \vdots & \$(500-p) & \vdots & \$(400-p) & \$(300-p) \\
\frac{120}{1120}=\frac{3}{28} & & \frac{200}{1120}=\frac{5}{28} & & \frac{100}{1120}=\frac{5}{56} & & \frac{240}{1120}=\frac{3}{14} & & \frac{320}{1120}=\frac{2}{7}
\end{array}\right.
$$

Suppose $p=460$

| Quality $q$ | best: $A$ | $B$ | $C$ | $D$ | $E$ | worst: $F$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $v(q)$ (seller) | 720 | 630 | 540 | 450 | 360 | 270 |

Back to previous example. Suppose that $\mathrm{p}=460$. Then only qualities D, E, F offered
Step 1: convert probabilities to a common denominator:

| Quality $q$ | best: $A$ | $B$ | $C$ | $D$ | $E$ | worst: $F$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Proportion | $p_{A}=\frac{3}{28}$ | $p_{B}=\frac{5}{28}$ | $p_{C}=\frac{5}{56}$ | $p_{D}=\frac{3}{14}$ | $p_{E}=\frac{2}{7}$ | $p_{F}=\frac{1}{8}$ |

Step 2: condition on $\{D, E, F\}$

| Quality $q$ | best: $A$ | $B$ | $C$ | $D$ | $E$ | worst: $F$ |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Proportion |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Suppose $p=380$

| Quality $q$ | best: $A$ | $B$ | $C$ | $D$ | $E$ | worst: $F$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $v(q)$ (seller) | 720 | 630 | 540 | 450 | 360 | 270 |


| Quality | $L$ | $M$ | $H$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| probability | $\frac{1}{6}$ | $\frac{2}{3}$ | $\frac{1}{6}$ |
| seller's value | 900 | 1,200 | 1,400 |
| buyer's value | 1,020 | 1,320 | 1,500 |

For every price $p$ determine if there is a second-hand market.

All-you-can eat buffet in Davis. Hire a market research firm to find out about demand. Customers of different types. A type of a customer is a pair $(r, c)$ where

- $r$ is the maximum price the customer is willing to pay
- $c$ is the number of dishes that the customer would consume



## Risk neutral. Cost per dish is $\mathbf{\$ 2 . 4 0}$.

- If you charge $\$ 8$ then average consumption

Average cost per customer
Profit per customer
$\begin{array}{cccccccc} & \text { Customer type } & (\$ 8,2) & (\$ 8,2.5) & (\$ 8.50,2.5) & (\$ 8.50,3) & (\$ 9,3) & (\$ 9,3.5) \\ \text { What if you charge } \$ 8.50 ? & \text { Proportion } & \frac{1}{4} & \frac{1}{8} & \frac{1}{6} & \frac{1}{24} & \frac{1}{8} & \frac{7}{24}\end{array}$

Step 1: convert to same denominator Proportion

Customer type $\quad(\$ 8.50,2.5) \quad(\$ 8.50,3) \quad(\$ 9,3) \quad(\$ 9,3.5)$

- If you charge $\$ 8.50$ then Proportion

Average consumption:

Average cost per customer
Profit per customer

## Customer type $\quad(\$ 9,3) \quad(\$ 9,3.5)$

- If you charge $\$ 9$ then Proportion

Average consumption:

Average cost per customer Profit per customer

