Through any point in the wealth space go **two** indifference curves: a less steep one corresponding to effort and a steeper one corresponding to no effort.

No-effort indifference curves:



Next the no-effort indifference curves:



Indifference curves that go through the NI point:







The monopolist will want the consumer to be on the **reservation utility locus**. But which contract on this locus will it offer?

It cannot be a point strictly between NI and A:



It cannot be a point strictly between A and F:





## TWO EXAMPLES

## Example 1.

$$W = 10,000 \qquad L = 1,900 \qquad p_n = \frac{4}{10} \qquad p_e = \frac{1}{10} \qquad \begin{array}{c} U_n(m) \equiv U(m,0) = \sqrt{m} \\ U_e(m) \equiv U(m,e) = \sqrt{m} - 1 \end{array}$$

Then

 $\mathbb{E}[U_n(NI)] =$ 

 $\mathbb{E}[U_{e}(NI)] =$ 

So under no insurance the agent chooses



What contract would a monopolist offer? The choice is between A and F.

Find the premium of contract *F*. Given by the solution to:

Corresponding profits:

Calculate premium and deductible for contract *A*:

(on the no-effort indifference curve for utility 98)

(on the effort indifference curve for utility 98)

The solution is:  $h_A = d_A =$ 

Corresponding profits:

Thus the monopolist will offer

**Example 2** ("effort" is a monetary expense).

W = 8,000 
$$L = 3,000$$
  $p_n = \frac{1}{8}$   $p_e = \frac{1}{10}$   $U(m) \equiv 10 \ln(m)$ 

Cost of "effort": \$50.

 $\mathbb{E}[U_n(NI)] =$ 

 $\mathbb{E}[U_e(NI)] =$ 

So under no insurance the agent chooses



What contract would a monopolist offer? The choice is between A and F:

Find the premium of contract F. Given by the solution to:

Corresponding profits:

Calculate premium and deductible of contract A.

Given by the solution to:

(on the no-effort indifference curve for utility 89.335)

(on the effort indifference curve for utility 89.335)

The solution is:  $h_A = d_A =$ 

Corresponding profits: