## University of California, Davis -- Department of Economics

**ECON 106 : DECISION MAKING** Professor Giacomo Bonanno

SPRING 2025 - FIRST MIDTERM EXAM Version 1

Answer all questions. If you don't explain (= show your work for) your answers you will get no credit.

NAME:	Un	University ID:		
CIRCLE THE NAME O	F YO	UR TA:		
Zander Memon	or	Alec Navori	or	Laurin Curschellas
<b>or</b> write your Discussion S	ection	number:		_

- By writing your name on this exam you certify that you have not violated the University's Code of Academic Contact (for example, you have not copied from the work of another student and you have not knowingly facilitated cheating by another student).
- If you submit the exam without writing your name and ID, you will get a score of 0 for this exam.
- If you do not stop writing when told so (at the end), a penalty of 10 points will be deducted from your score.

**1.** [19 points] Seth is facing the following decision problem:

He says that act a weakly (but not strictly) dominates act b.

(a) [9 points] Below is a list of complete and transitive rankings of the set of outcomes  $\{z_1, z_2, z_3, z_4\}$ . Circle all those (and only those) that are compatible with the information given above.

1. 
$$z_1 \succ z_2 \succ z_3 \succ z_4$$

$$2. \ z_1 \succ z_3 \succ z_2 \succ z_4 \qquad \qquad 3. \ z_1 \succ z_4 \succ z_3 \sim z_2$$

3. 
$$z_1 > z_4 > z_3 \sim z_2$$

4. 
$$z_1 \sim z_2 \succ z_3 \sim z_4$$

5. 
$$z_4 > z_1 - z_2 > z_3$$

6. 
$$z_2 > z_1 > z_3 \sim z_4$$


7. 
$$z_1 \sim z_3 \succ z_2 \succ z_4$$

8. 
$$z_2 > z_1 - z_3 > z_4$$

9. 
$$z_2 > z_1 - z_3 - z_4$$

(b) [10 points] Suppose that Seth adds the following information: if he knew that the state were  $s_1$  then he would *strictly* prefer choosing act a rather than act b. Find all the possible complete and transitive rankings of the set of outcomes that are compatible with this additional information. [Do **not** restrict attention to the rankings listed in Part (a).]

2. [30 points] Julia faces the decision problem represented by the following tree. Julia prefers more money to less and is risk neutral.



(a) [8 points] If Julia told you that if she decided to choose A then she would follow with T, what would you be able to infer about the value of p?

(b) [8 points] If Julia told you that if p = 40%, then she would choose D, what would you be able to infer about the value of X?

(c) [8 points] Suppose that $X = 120$ . Find Julia's optimal decision for every possible value of $p$ .
(d) [6 points] Suppose that $p = 20\%$ . Find Julia's optimal decision for every possible value of $X$ .

**3.** [35 points] Consider the following decision problem:

The agent's ranking of the outcomes is as follows (where  $\succ$  means 'better than' and  $\sim$  means 'just as good as'):

$$z_6 \succ z_{12} \succ z_9 \succ z_4 \succ z_3 \succ z_8 \succ z_2 \sim z_{11} \succ z_5 \sim z_{10} \succ z_7 \succ z_1$$

(a) [10 points] Find two actions such that one strictly dominates the other. State which one dominates the other. [Write your answer below]

(b) [10 points] Find two actions such that one weakly (but not strictly) dominates the other. State which one dominates the other. [Write your answer below]

- (c) [8 points] Find the Maximin solution. [Write your answer below]
- (d) [7 points] Find the Leximin solution. [Write your answer below]

**4.** [16 points] Bob's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is  $U(\$x) = \sqrt{x}$ . He faces the following decision problem:

probability 
$$\frac{1}{6}$$
  $\frac{3}{6}$   $\frac{2}{6}$  state  $\rightarrow$   $s_1$   $s_2$   $s_3$  act  $\downarrow$   $A$  \$25 \$100 \$16  $B$  \$64 \$81 \$9  $C$  \$4 \$36 \$49

(a) [9 points] What act will **Bob** choose? Explain your answer. [Write your answer below.]

**(b)** [7 points] Find Bob's **normalized** utility function for the sums of money in the above table. [Write your answer below.]