

First question to ask yourself:  
what is my ranking of the basic outcomes?

state	→	$s_1$	$s_2$	$s_3$
act	↓			
$a_1$		$z_1$	$z_2$	$z_3$
$a_2$		$z_4$	$z_5$	$z_6$
$a_3$		$z_7$	$z_8$	$z_9$

Suppose your  
answer is:



state	→	$s_1$	$s_2$	$s_3$	best	$z_8$
act	↓					
$a_1$		$z_1$	$z_2$	$z_3$		$z_3$
<del><math>a_2</math></del>		<del><math>z_4</math></del>	<del><math>z_5</math></del>	<del><math>z_6</math></del>		$z_1, z_9$
$a_3$		$z_7$	$z_8$	$z_9$		$z_2, z_6$
					worst	$z_4, z_5$
						$z_7$

$$z_1 > z_4 \quad z_2 > z_5 \quad z_3 > z_6$$

Note:

- $a_1$  strictly dominates  $a_2$

Thus ...

				<i>NORMALIZED</i> Utility		
state →	$s_1$	$s_2$	$s_3$	best	$z_8$	1
act ↓					$z_3$	$\frac{3}{4}$
$a_1$	$z_1$	$z_2$	$z_3$		$z_1, z_9$	$\frac{2}{3}$
$a_3$	$z_7$	$z_8$	$z_9$		$z_2$	$\frac{2}{5}$
				worst	$z_7$	0

Three questions to ask yourself:

**Note that  $p$  is the probability of the worst outcome, not the best**

(1) What  $p$  is such that  $\begin{pmatrix} z_3 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \sim \begin{pmatrix} z_7 & z_8 \\ p & 1-p \end{pmatrix}$ ? Suppose the answer is  $p = \frac{1}{4}$

(2) What  $p$  is such that  $\begin{pmatrix} z_1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \sim \begin{pmatrix} z_7 & z_8 \\ p & 1-p \end{pmatrix}$ ? Suppose the answer is  $p = \frac{1}{3}$

(3) What  $p$  is such that  $\begin{pmatrix} z_2 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \sim \begin{pmatrix} z_7 & z_8 \\ p & 1-p \end{pmatrix}$ ? Suppose the answer is  $p = \frac{3}{5}$

			<i>easier to use</i>	
			↓	
	Utility			
best	$z_8$	1		60
	$z_3$	$\frac{3}{4}$	<i>multiply all by 60</i>	45
	$z_1, z_9$	$\frac{2}{3}$		40
	$z_2$	$\frac{2}{5}$		24
worst	$z_7$	0		0

In order not to deal with fractions, rescale the utility function by multiplying each number by 60:

with the normalized utility function

	$s_1$	$s_2$	$s_3$		Utility
$a_1$	$\frac{2}{3}$	$\frac{2}{5}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	best	$z_8$ 60
					$z_3$ 45
$a_3$	0	1	$\frac{2}{3}$		$z_1, z_9$ 40
					$z_2$ 24
				worst	$z_7$ 0

$$E[U(a_1)] = \frac{1}{5} \frac{2}{3} + \frac{3}{5} \frac{2}{5} + \frac{1}{5} \frac{3}{4} = \frac{31.4}{60}$$

$$E[U(a_3)] = \frac{1}{5} \cdot 0 + \frac{3}{5} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{5} \cdot \frac{2}{3} = \frac{44}{60}$$

state →	$s_1$	$s_2$	$s_3$
act ↓			
$a_1$	40	24	45
$a_3$	0	60	40

Next step: try to assign probabilities to the states (from objective data or some subjective assessment). Suppose you assess the following:


state:	$s_1$	$s_2$	$s_3$
probability:	$\frac{1}{5}$	$\frac{3}{5}$	$\frac{1}{5}$

Then:  $E[U(a_1)] = \frac{1}{5} 40 + \frac{3}{5} 24 + \frac{1}{5} 45 = 31.4$

→  $E[U(a_3)] = \frac{1}{5} 0 + \frac{3}{5} 60 + \frac{1}{5} 40 = 44$

Hence you should take action  $a_3$


# Decision tree



Suppose that  
for you  $z_2 \succ z_1$

Suppose that for you  
 $z_4 \succ z_5$

**First question** to ask yourself: how do I rank  $z_1$  and  $z_2$ ? Suppose that the answer is  $z_2 \succ z_1$ .



**Second question** to ask yourself: how do I rank  $z_4$  and  $z_5$ ? Suppose that the answer is  $z_4 \succ z_5$ .


$$a: \begin{pmatrix} z_2 & z_3 \\ \frac{2}{5} & \frac{3}{5} \end{pmatrix}$$


$$b: \begin{pmatrix} z_4 & z_6 \\ \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix}$$

Assumptions:

$$z_2 > z_1$$

$$z_4 > z_5$$






Next question: how do I rank the remaining four outcomes? Suppose:

		Utility
best	$z_2$	1
	$z_6$	
	$z_4$	
worst	$z_3$	0

This is sufficient to eliminate the random event on the left:

$$\begin{aligned}
 E[V(a)] &= \frac{2}{5} V(z_2) + \frac{3}{5} V(z_3) & a: & \begin{pmatrix} z_2 & z_3 \\ \frac{2}{5} & \frac{3}{5} \end{pmatrix} \\
 &= \frac{2}{5} \cdot 1 + \frac{3}{5} \cdot 0 = \frac{2}{5}
 \end{aligned}$$




Two more questions and then you are done!

(4) What  $p$  is such that  $\begin{pmatrix} z_6 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \sim \begin{pmatrix} z_2 & z_3 \\ p & 1-p \end{pmatrix}$ ? Suppose the answer is  $p = \frac{1}{2}$ .


(5) What  $p$  is such that  $\begin{pmatrix} z_4 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \sim \begin{pmatrix} z_2 & z_3 \\ p & 1-p \end{pmatrix}$ ? Suppose the answer is  $p = \frac{1}{10}$ .

Then the lottery corresponding to the random event on the right has an expected utility of

$$\begin{aligned}
 E[U(b)] &= \frac{1}{2} U(z_4) + \frac{1}{2} U(z_6) = \\
 &= \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{10} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{2} = \frac{3}{10}
 \end{aligned}$$



Hence the optimal decision is to first take action *a* and then, if a second choice is required between *c* and *d*, choose *d*:





## THE HURWICZ INDEX

- $\alpha$  ( $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$ ) weight attached to the **worst** outcome: index of pessimism
- $(1-\alpha)$  weight attached to the **best** outcome: **index of optimism**.

	$s_1$	$s_2$	$s_3$
$a_1$	8	1	0
$a_2$	6	2	3
$a_3$	0	3	4

MaxiMin =  $a_2$   
 corresponds to  
 taking  $d=1$

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$$H_\alpha(a_1) = 0 \cdot \alpha + 8 \cdot (1-\alpha) = 8 - 8\alpha$$

$$H_\alpha(a_2) = 2 \cdot \alpha + 6(1-\alpha) = 6 - 4\alpha$$

$$H_\alpha(a_3) = 0 \cdot \alpha + 4(1-\alpha) = 4 - 4\alpha$$

if  $\alpha = \frac{1}{8}$

$$H_{\frac{1}{8}}(a_1) = 8 - 8 \cdot \frac{1}{8} = \textcircled{7}$$

$$H_{\frac{1}{8}}(a_2) = 6 - 4 \cdot \frac{1}{8} = 5.5$$

$$H_{\frac{1}{8}}(a_3) = 4 - 4 \cdot \frac{1}{8} = 3.5$$

$\Downarrow$   
 choose  $a_1$

Then choose the act that gives the highest value. For example, if  $\alpha = \frac{3}{4}$  then

$$H_{\frac{3}{4}}(a_1) = \quad H_{\frac{3}{4}}(a_2) = \quad H_{\frac{3}{4}}(a_3) = \quad \text{thus choose}$$

If  $\alpha = 1$  then = MaxiMin criterion.

Suppose I multiply all numbers  
by 3

	$s_1$	$s_2$	$s_3$		$s_1$	$s_2$	$s_3$
$a_1$	8	1	0	$a_1$	24	3	0
$a_2$	6	2	3	$a_2$	18	6	9
$a_3$	0	3	4	$a_3$	0	9	12

$$H_\alpha(a_1) = 0\alpha + 8(1-\alpha) = 8 - 8\alpha$$

$$H_\alpha(a_2) = 2\alpha + 6(1-\alpha) = 6 - 4\alpha$$

$$H_\alpha(a_3) = 0\alpha + 4(1-\alpha) = 4 - 4\alpha$$

Is it still true that

$$H_{\frac{1}{8}}(a_1) > H_{\frac{1}{8}}(a_2)$$

$$21 > 16.5$$