A Search-Based Theory of the On-the-Run Phenomenon

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May 30, 2007

ABSTRACT

We propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices. Infinitely-lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market, or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market. We show that short-sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed. That asset enjoys greater liquidity, measured by search times, and a higher lending fee (“specialness”). Liquidity and specialness translate into price premia that are consistent with no-arbitrage. We derive closed-form solutions for small frictions, and can generate price differentials in line with observed on-the-run premia.

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In fixed-income markets some bonds trade at lower yields than others with almost identical cash flows. In the US, for example, just-issued (“on-the-run”) Treasury bonds trade at lower yields than previously issued (“off-the-run”) bonds maturing on nearby dates. Warga (1992) reports that an on-the-run portfolio returns on average 55bps below an off-the-run portfolio with matched duration. Similar phenomena exist in other countries. In Japan, for example, one “benchmark” government bond trades at a yield of 60bps below other bonds with comparable characteristics.¹

How can the yields of bonds with almost identical cash flows differ by more than 50bps? Financial economists have suggested two apparently distinct hypotheses. First, on-the-run bonds are more valuable because they are significantly more liquid than their off-the-run counterparts. Second, on-the-run bonds constitute better collateral for borrowing money in the repo market. Namely, loans collateralized by on-the-run bonds offer lower interest rates than their off-the-run counterparts, a phenomenon referred to as “specialness.”² These hypotheses, however, can provide only a partial explanation of the on-the-run phenomenon: one must still explain why assets with almost identical cash flows can differ in liquidity and specialness.

In this paper we propose a theory of the on-the-run phenomenon. We argue that liquidity and specialness are not independent explanations of this phenomenon, but can be explained simultaneously by short-selling activity. We determine liquidity and specialness endogenously, explain why they can differ across otherwise identical assets, and study their effect on prices. A calibration of our model for plausible parameter values can generate effects of the observed magnitude.

We consider an infinite-horizon steady-state economy with two assets paying identical cash flows. There is a continuum of agents experiencing transitory needs to hold long or short positions. An agent needing to be long buys an asset, and sells it later when the need disappears. Conversely, an agent needing to be short borrows an asset, sells it, and when the need disappears buys the asset back and delivers it to the lender. Trade involves two markets: a spot market to buy and sell, and a repo market where short-sellers can borrow assets. We assume that both markets operate through search, and model them as in the standard framework (e.g., Diamond (1982)) where agents are matched randomly over time in pairs and bargain over the terms of trade. This captures the over-the-counter structure of government-bond markets: transactions between dealers and customers are negotiated bilaterally over the phone, and dealers often negotiate bilaterally in the inter-dealer market.³ Of course, the search framework is a stylized representation of government-bond markets—but so is the Walrasian auction which assumes multilateral trading. As long as search times are short, as is the case in our calibration, it is not obvious which model describes the markets better.
Our model has an asymmetric equilibrium in which assets trade at different prices despite the identical cash flows. The intuition is as follows. Suppose that all short-sellers prefer to borrow a specific asset. Because they initially sell and eventually buy the asset back, they increase the asset’s trading volume in the spot market. This increases the asset’s liquidity by reducing search frictions: with more volume, buyers and sellers become easier to locate. What makes short-sellers’ concentration self-fulfilling is the constraint that they must deliver the same asset they borrowed. This constraint implies that a short-seller finds it optimal to borrow the asset that is easier to locate, which is precisely the asset that other short-sellers are borrowing.\(^4\) The asset in which short-sellers concentrate trades at a premium for two reasons. Since it has a larger pool of buyers, it is easier to sell, and thus carries a liquidity premium. It also carries a specialness premium because its owners can lend it to short-sellers for a fee, thus deriving an additional cash flow from holding the asset.

Our mechanism relies critically on short-sellers: we show that in their absence, assets trade at the same price. One could conjecture that even without short-sellers, asymmetric liquidity can arise in a self-fulfilling manner: one asset is harder to sell because its lack of liquidity drives buyers away. What rules out such asymmetries is that the difficulty to sell hurts sellers more than buyers because for buyers it becomes relevant only later in time when they turn into sellers. Thus, sellers of a less liquid asset are willing to lower the price enough to compensate buyers. But then buyers buy both assets, implying that both are equally easy to sell and trade at the same price.

Short-sellers can introduce asymmetries because, unlike longs, they are constrained to buy a specific asset - the one they borrowed. The mere presence of short-sellers, however, does not guarantee asymmetries because they could borrow both assets equally. Asymmetries are possible because of the assumption of spot-market search. Indeed, because search generates a positive relationship between trading volume and liquidity, it implies that short-sellers have a preference for an asset that other short-sellers are borrowing. To emphasize the critical role of search, we show that if the spot market is Walrasian, then assets trade at the same price.

While the combination of short-sellers and spot-market search generates asymmetric liquidity, repo-market search ensures that the asymmetry can translate to a quantitatively significant price difference. Indeed, search precludes Bertrand competition between lenders in the repo market, and generates a positive lending fee. A positive fee gives rise to the specialness premium, which adds to the liquidity premium. Furthermore, the shorting costs implicit in the fee prevent arbitrageurs from eliminating the price difference between the two assets.

A calibration of our model can generate price effects of the observed magnitude even for very
short search times. We show that the liquidity premium is small, and the effects are mostly generated by the specialness premium. Of course, this does not mean that liquidity does not matter; it rather means that liquidity can have large effects because it induces short-seller concentration and creates specialness.

Summarizing, our main contribution is to explain why assets with almost identical payoffs, such as on- and off-the-run bonds, can trade at significantly different prices. Our model also provides a framework for understanding other puzzling aspects of the on-the-run phenomenon. One apparent puzzle is that off-the-run bonds are viewed by traders as “scarce” and hard to locate, while at the same time being cheaper than on-the-run bonds. In our model, off-the-run bonds are indeed scarce from the viewpoint of short-sellers searching to buy and deliver them. Because, however, scarcity drives short-sellers away from these bonds, it makes them less liquid and less attractive to marginal buyers who are the agents seeking to establish long positions. Our theory also has the counter-intuitive implication that the trading activity of short-sellers can raise, rather than lower, an asset’s price. This is because short-sellers increase both the asset’s liquidity and specialness.

While our theory can explain price differences between on- and off-the-run bonds, it does not explain why short-sellers are more likely to concentrate in on-the-run bonds.\textsuperscript{5} We show, however, that if assets differ enough in their supplies (i.e., issue sizes), the equilibrium becomes unique with short-sellers concentrating in the largest-supply asset. This is consistent with the commonly held view that off-the-run bonds are in smaller effective supply (because, e.g., they become “locked away” in the portfolios of buy-and-hold investors). Of course, our theory cannot address the decrease in effective supply because it assumes a steady state.

This paper is closely related to Duffie’s (1996) theory of repo specialness. In Duffie, short-sellers need to borrow an asset and sell it in a market with exogenous transaction costs. Assets differ in transaction costs, and those with low costs are on special because they are in high demand by short-sellers. The main difference with Duffie is that instead of explaining specialness taking liquidity (transaction costs) as exogenous, we explain why both liquidity and specialness can differ for otherwise identical assets. Krishnamurthy (2002) proposes a model building on Duffie (1996) that links the specialness premium to an exogenous liquidity premium. This link is also present in our model where the liquidity premium is endogenous.\textsuperscript{6}

Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen introduce search and matching in models of dynamic asset market equilibrium.\textsuperscript{7} In Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2007) investors seek to establish long positions, and in Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2005) trade is intermediated through dealers.
Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2002) model search in the repo market and show that it generates a positive lending fee. Our focus differs in that we seek to explain price differences among otherwise identical assets. This leads us to consider a multi-asset model while they assume only one asset, and allow for search in both the spot and the repo market.

Vayanos and Wang (2007) and Weill (2007) develop multi-asset models with search, in which assets with identical payoffs can trade at different prices. They assume no short-sellers, however, and the price differences are driven by the constraint that longs must choose which asset to buy before starting the search process. This constraint is somewhat implausible in the context of the Treasury market since, for example, longs have the flexibility of buying any asset when they contact a dealer. In the present paper, by contrast, price differences are driven by the more standard constraint that short-sellers must deliver the same asset they borrowed. Furthermore, the presence of short-sellers allows us to explore the interplay between liquidity and specialness, and generate much larger price effects.

This paper is related to the monetary-search literature building on Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and Trejos and Wright (1995). Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright (1996) provide an example of an economy in which fiat monies (intrinsically worthless and unbacked pieces of paper) endogenously differ in their price and liquidity. Wallace (2000) analyzes the relative liquidity of currency and dividend-paying assets in a model based on asset indivisibility. Our relative contribution is to compare dividend-paying assets as opposed to currency, and introduce short sales.

This paper is also related to the literature on equilibrium asset pricing with transaction costs. (See, for example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Constantinides (1986), Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Vayanos (1998), Vayanos and Vila (1999), Huang (2003), and Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004).) We add to that literature by endogenizing transaction costs.

Pagano (1989) generates asymmetric liquidity because traders can concentrate in one of multiple markets. Our work differs because we consider concentration across assets rather than market venues for the same asset. Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1993) show that asymmetric liquidity can arise when a monopolistic bond issuer uses liquidity as a price-discrimination tool.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the model. Section II shows that the model is based on a minimum set of assumptions: when any assumption is relaxed, the Law of One Price holds. Section III derives the main results, Section IV draws empirical implications, Section V calibrates the model and Section VI concludes. An Appendix gathers some of the main
proofs, and the full set of proofs is in an online Appendix available from the Journal’s and the authors’ websites.

I. Model

Time is continuous and goes from zero to infinity. There are two assets $i \in \{1, 2\}$ that pay an identical dividend flow $\delta$ and are in identical supply $S$. Agents are infinitely lived and form a continuum with infinite mass. They can hold long or short positions in either asset. For simplicity, however, we allow for only three types of portfolios: long one share (of either asset), short one share, or no position.

Agents derive a utility flow from holding a position. The utility flow is zero for an agent holding no position. An agent holding $q \in \{-1, 1\}$ shares of either asset derives utility flow $q(\delta + x_t) - y$, where $y > 0$ and $\{x_t\}_{t \geq 0}$ is a stochastic process taking the values $\bar{x} > 0$, $0$, and $-\bar{x} < 0$. We refer to agents with $x_t = \bar{x}$ as high-valuation, $x_t = 0$ as average-valuation, and $x_t = -\bar{x}$ as low-valuation. Agents’ lifetime utility is the present value (PV) of expected utility flows, net of payments for asset transactions, and discounted at a rate $r > 0$.

Our utility specification can be interpreted in terms of risk aversion. If the parameter $\delta$ is an expected rather than actual dividend flow, $q\delta$ represents a position’s expected cash flow. This cash flow needs to be adjusted for risk. The parameter $y$ represents a cost of risk bearing, which is positive for both long and short positions. The parameters $\bar{x}$ and $\bar{\bar{x}}$ represent hedging benefits. For example, low-valuation agents could be hedging the risk of a long position held in a different but correlated market. A short position would give these hedgers an extra utility $\bar{x}$, while a long position would give them a disutility $-\bar{x}$. In online Appendix E we derive our utility specification from first principles. We assume that agents have CARA preferences over a single consumption good, and can invest in a riskless asset with return $r$ and in two identical risky assets with expected dividend flow $\delta$. Moreover, agents receive a random endowment whose correlation with the dividend flow can be positive (low-valuation), zero (average-valuation), or negative (high-valuation). These assumptions give rise to our reduced-form specification, with the parameters $y$, $\bar{x}$, $\bar{\bar{x}}$ being functions of the agents’ risk-aversion, the variance of the dividend flow, and the endowment correlation. We leave the CARA specification to the Appendix because the reduced form conveys the main intuitions without burdening the derivations.

At each point in time, there is a flow $\bar{F}$ of average-valuation agents who switch to high valuation,
and a flow $F$ who switch to low valuation. Conversely, high-valuation agents revert to average valuation with Poisson intensity $\kappa$, and low-valuation agents do the same with Poisson intensity $\kappa$. Thus, the steady-state measures of high- and low-valuation agents are $F/\kappa$ and $E/\kappa$, respectively. Given that the measure of average-valuation agents is infinite, an individual agent’s switching intensity from average to high or low valuation is zero.

For simplicity, we impose the following parameter restrictions.

**Assumption 1.** $\bar{x} + x > 2y > \bar{x}$.

**Assumption 2.** $F/\kappa > 2S + \frac{E}{\kappa}$.

Assumption 1 ensures that low-valuation agents are willing to short-sell in equilibrium, while average-valuation agents are not. Indeed, consider a low-valuation agent who establishes a short position with a high-valuation agent as the long counterpart. The flow surplus of the transaction is the sum of the high-valuation agent’s utility flow from the long position plus the low-valuation agent’s utility flow from the short position:

$$[\delta + \bar{x} - y] + [-(\delta - x) - y] = \bar{x} + x - 2y.$$

Assumption 1 ensures that this is positive because the combined hedging benefits $\bar{x} + x$ exceed the total cost $2y$ of risk bearing. On the other hand, the flow surplus when the short-seller is an average-valuation agent is $[\delta + \bar{x} - y] + [-\delta - y] = \bar{x} - 2y < 0$.

Assumption 2 ensures that high-valuation agents are the marginal asset holders. Indeed, the aggregate asset supply is the sum of the supply $2S$ from the issuers plus the supply from the short-sellers. Since low-valuation agents are the only short-sellers and short one share, the latter supply is equal to their measure $F/\kappa$. The aggregate supply is thus smaller than the measure $F/\kappa$ of high-valuation agents, meaning that these agents are marginal.

In what follows, we focus on steady-state equilibria. Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that in such equilibria high-valuation agents seek to establish long positions, low-valuation agents seek to establish short positions, and average-valuation agents stay out of the market.

## II. Market Settings Consistent with the Law of One Price

In our main model of Section III there are two markets, both operating through search: a spot market to buy and sell assets, and a repo market where short-sellers can borrow assets. In this
section we take a step back and argue that the combination of short-sellers and a search spot market are necessary for explaining the on-the-run phenomenon. Namely, we consider benchmark settings where either short-sales are not allowed or the spot market is Walrasian. We show that in these settings the Law of One Price holds, i.e., assets 1 and 2 trade at the same price.

A. No Short-Sales

We start with the case where short-sales are not allowed. The repo market is then shut, and agents trade only in the spot market. Not surprisingly, the Law of One Price holds when the spot market is Walrasian.

**Proposition 1** (No Short-Sales, Walrasian Spot Market). Suppose that short-sales are not allowed. In a Walrasian equilibrium both assets trade at the same price

\[ p = \frac{\delta + \bar{\pi} - y}{r} \]

Moreover, high-valuation agents buy one share or stay out of the market, and low- and average-valuation agents stay out of the market.

The intuition why both assets trade at the same price is straightforward: if one were cheaper, it would be the only one demanded by agents. The common price of the assets is determined by the marginal holders. From Assumption 2, these are the high-valuation agents, and the price is equal to the PV of their utility flow \( \delta + \bar{\pi} - y \) from holding one share. Under this price, high-valuation agents are indifferent between buying and staying out of the market, while other agents prefer to stay out of the market.

We next assume that the spot market operates through search. As in the standard search framework, buyers and sellers are matched randomly over time in pairs. The buyers are high-valuation agents, and the sellers are average-valuation agents who bought when they were high-valuation. We denote by \( \mu_B \) the measure of buyers and by \( \mu_S \) the measure of sellers of asset \( i \). We assume that an agent establishes contact with others at Poisson arrival times with fixed intensity, and that conditional on establishing a contact all agents are equally likely to be contacted. Thus, an agent meets members of a given group with Poisson intensity proportional to that group’s measure. For example, a buyer meets sellers of asset \( i \) with Poisson intensity \( \lambda \mu_B \mu_S \), where \( \lambda \) is a parameter measuring the efficiency of search. The Law of Large Numbers (see Duffie and Sun (2007)) implies that meetings between buyers and sellers of asset \( i \) occur at a deterministic rate \( \lambda \mu_B \mu_S \). When
a buyer meets a seller of asset $i$, they bargain over the price $p_i$. We assume that bargaining is efficient, in that trade occurs whenever the buyer’s reservation utility exceeds the seller’s. If trade occurs, the price is set so that the buyer receives a fraction $\phi \in [0, 1]$ of the surplus. Proposition 2 shows that trade always occurs in equilibrium.

Figure 1 describes the types of agents in the market and the transitions between types. A high-valuation agent is initially a buyer $b$, seeking a seller of either asset. If he reverts to average valuation before meeting a seller, he exits the market. Otherwise, if he meets a seller of asset $i$, he bargains over the price $p_i$, buys the asset, and becomes a non-searcher $n_i$. When he reverts to average valuation, he becomes a seller $s_i$, seeking a buyer. Upon meeting a buyer, he bargains over the price, sells the asset, and exits the market.

Proposition 2 (No Short-Sales, Search Spot Market). Suppose that short-sales are not allowed. In a search equilibrium all buyer-seller meetings result in a trade, and both assets trade at the same price.

Proposition 2 shows that the Law of One Price holds even in the presence of search frictions. In particular, there do not exist asymmetric equilibria in which assets differ in liquidity. One could conjecture, for example, an equilibrium in which buyers refuse to trade when they meet sellers of asset 2, preferring to wait for sellers of asset 1. This behavior could be based on a self-fulfilling expectation of low liquidity: a buyer fears that asset 2 will be difficult to sell because he expects that other buyers will also refuse to buy. What rules out such equilibria is that the difficulty to sell hurts sellers even more than buyers because for buyers it becomes relevant only later in time when they turn into sellers. As a consequence, sellers of asset 2 are willing to lower the price enough to compensate buyers for any difficulties they will encounter when selling the asset. But then both assets have the same buyer pool, consisting of high-valuation agents. Therefore, they are equally easy to sell, and trade at the same price.

Proposition 2 implies that search frictions alone are not enough to generate price differences among otherwise identical assets. One must also explain why assets’ buyer pools can be different. Vayanos and Wang (2007) and Weill (2007) derive price differences in settings where buyers must choose which asset to buy before starting the search process. This constraint, however, is somewhat implausible in the context of the Treasury market. Suppose, for example, that a buyer contacts a dealer for an on-the-run bond. If the dealer happens to have an attractively priced
off-the-run bond in inventory, nothing prevents the buyer from switching to that bond. The con-
straint becomes much more plausible if buyers are not agents seeking to initiate long positions (as
in Vayanos and Wang (2007) and Weill (2007)), but seeking to cover previously established short
positions. Considering short-sellers and the related issue of repo specialness is a central and novel
element of our theory.

Our main model of Section III adds short-sellers to the model of spot-market search presented
in this section. Before moving to the main model, we show in Section II.B that search in the spot
market is essential for our theory. Namely, we return to the case of a Walrasian spot market, and
show that the Law of One Price holds in the presence of short-sellers, both when the repo market
is Walrasian and when it operates through search.

B. Short-Sales – Walrasian Spot Market

To motivate our modelling of the repo market, we recall the mechanics of repo transactions. In
a repo transaction a lender turns his asset to a borrower in exchange for cash. At maturity the
borrower must return an asset from the same issue, and the lender returns the cash together with
some previously-agreed interest-rate payment, called the repo rate. Hence, a repo transaction is
effectively a loan of cash collateralized by the asset. Treasury securities differ in their repo rates.
Most of them share the same rate, called the general collateral rate, which is the highest quoted
repo rate and is close to the Fed Funds Rate. The specialness of an asset is defined as the difference
between the general collateral rate and its repo rate. In our model, instead of assuming that the
lender pays a low repo rate to the borrower, we assume that the borrower pays a positive flow fee
$w$ to the lender. Hence, the implied repo rate is the difference $r − w/p$ between the risk-free rate
and the lending fee per dollar, and the specialness is simply $w/p$.

When the spot and the repo market are both Walrasian, the Law of One Price holds in both
markets: the assets trade at the same price and carry the same lending fee. Furthermore, the fee is
zero. Indeed, with a positive fee, agents would prefer to lend their assets in the repo market rather
than holding them. This would be inconsistent with equilibrium since assets are in positive supply.

**Proposition 3** (Short-Sales, Walrasian Spot and Repo Markets). *Suppose that short-sales are
allowed. In a Walrasian equilibrium both assets trade at the same price

\[ p = \frac{\delta + \pi - y}{r} \]
and the lending fee \( w \) is zero. Moreover, high-valuation agents buy one share or stay out of the market, low-valuation agents short one share, and average-valuation agents stay out of the market.

We next assume that the repo market operates through search, with lenders and borrowers matched randomly over time in pairs. The lenders are high-valuation agents owning an asset, and the borrowers are low-valuation agents seeking to initiate a short-sale. We denote by \( \mu_{\text{bo}} \) the measure of borrowers and by \( \mu_{\ell_i} \) the measure of lenders of asset \( i \). We assume the same matching technology as in Section II.A: meetings between borrowers and lenders of asset \( i \) occur at the deterministic rate \( \nu \mu_{\text{bo}} \mu_{\ell_i} \), where \( \nu \) is a parameter measuring the efficiency of repo-market search. When a borrower meets a lender, they bargain over the lending fee. We assume that bargaining is efficient, in that the repo transaction occurs whenever there is a positive surplus. If the transaction occurs, the lending fee is set so that the lender receives a fraction \( \theta \in [0, 1] \) of the surplus.

**Proposition 4** (Short-Sales, Walrasian Spot Market, Search Repo market). *Suppose that short-sales are allowed, the spot market is Walrasian, and the repo market operates through search. In equilibrium both assets trade at the same price and carry the same positive lending fee.*

Proposition 4 implies that search frictions in the repo market alone cannot generate departures from the Law of One Price: the assets trade at the same price and carry the same lending fee. The only effect of repo-market frictions is that the fee is positive. The mechanism is the same as in Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002): search precludes Bertrand competition between lenders because borrowers can only meet one lender at a time.

To explain why the Law of One Price holds, consider a possible asymmetric equilibrium where short-sellers refuse to borrow asset 2, preferring to wait for a lender of asset 1. Such behavior could be based on the expectation that asset 2 might be harder to deliver when unwinding the repo contract. But with a Walrasian spot market, both assets can be costlessly bought and delivered. Therefore, short-sellers are willing to borrow both. Note that the same conclusion would hold if there are transaction costs in the spot market, provided that these are equal across assets.

While search frictions in the repo market alone cannot explain the on-the-run puzzle, they can be part of the explanation. Indeed, suppose that for some (yet unexplained) reason, short-sellers prefer to borrow a specific asset, e.g., asset 1. Then, the lenders of asset 1 can negotiate a positive lending fee, while there is no fee for asset 2. Since the lending fee constitutes an additional cash flow derived from an asset, it raises the price of asset 1 above that of asset 2, resulting in a departure from the Law of One Price.
Why might short-sellers prefer to borrow a specific asset? A natural reason is that the asset is easier to deliver because of lower transaction costs in the spot market. This is very plausible in the context of Treasuries: locating a large quantity of a specific off-the-run issue can be harder than for on-the-run issues. One must explain, however, why transaction costs can differ across two otherwise identical assets. As we argue in the next section, a natural explanation, and one which is central to our theory, is based on search frictions in the spot market.\(^{12}\)

### III. Departing from the Law of One Price

Our theory of the on-the-run phenomenon is based on short-sellers and search frictions in the spot and the repo market. The basic mechanism is as follows. Suppose that all short-sellers prefer to borrow a specific asset. Because they initially sell and eventually buy the asset back, they increase the asset’s trading volume in the spot market. This increases the asset’s liquidity by reducing search frictions: with more volume, buyers and sellers become easier to locate. The increase in liquidity is, in turn, what makes the asset attractive to short-sellers because they can unwind their positions more easily. The asset in which short-sellers concentrate trades at a premium for two reasons. Since it has a larger pool of buyers, it is easier to sell, and thus carries a liquidity premium. It also carries a specialness premium because its owners can lend it to short-sellers for a fee.

The interaction between short-sellers and spot-market search is at the heart of our theory. Search can generate differences in spot-market liquidity among otherwise identical assets, but only if some investors trade one asset more than the other. As shown in Proposition 2, such asymmetric trading is hard to rationalize with longs: since they have the flexibility to buy either asset, they constitute a common buyer pool for both assets, and trade them equally. Short-sellers, by contrast, are constrained to buy the same asset they borrowed, and thus can generate asymmetric trading if they have a preference for a specific asset. This preference can arise if one asset is easier to deliver than the other. As shown in Proposition 4, such differences across assets are hard to rationalize without differences in spot-market liquidity, which is precisely what search can generate.

While the combination of short-sellers and spot-market search generates asymmetric liquidity, repo-market search ensures that the asymmetry can translate to a quantitatively significant price difference. Indeed, with a Walrasian repo market, both assets would have a lending fee of zero. Therefore, there would be no specialness premium—which according to our calibration is significantly larger than the liquidity premium. Moreover, a zero lending fee would imply no shorting costs. Thus, arbitrageurs could profit from (and eventually eliminate) the liquidity premium by selling
the more liquid asset and buying the less liquid one. In most of our analysis we do not consider arbitrage strategies because we restrict agents to hold either long or short positions. In Section III.D, however, we allow for such strategies and show that they can be unprofitable in the presence of repo-market frictions.

The model of this section adds short-sellers and a search repo market to the model of spot-market search presented in Section II.A. Sections III.A and III.B describe the model, Section III.C derives the equilibria, and Section III.D considers the possibility of arbitrage.

A. Agent Types and Transitions

This section describes the types of agents and the transitions between types. The possible types of a high-valuation agent are in Table I. Recall that in the model of spot-market search of Section II.A the agent can be a buyer $b$, non-searcher $ni$, or seller $si$. In the presence of short-sellers, the agent can also be a lender $\ell i$, having bought asset $i$ and seeking to lend it in the repo market. Furthermore, a high-valuation non-searcher is an agent who has bought and lent asset $i$. Depending on the type of his repo counterparty (described in the paragraph below), a high-valuation non-searcher can be of three types denoted by $(\pi_{ni}, \pi_{ni}, \pi_{bi})$. The upper bar refers to the agent being high-valuation and the lower bar refers to the repo counterparty who is low-valuation.

\text{INSERT TABLE I SOMEWHERE HERE}\n
The possible types of a low-valuation agent are in Table II. A low-valuation agent is initially a borrower $bo$, seeking to borrow an asset in the repo market. If she enters in a repo contract with a lender of asset $i$, she becomes a seller $si$, seeking a buyer. Upon selling the asset she becomes a non-searcher $ni$, and upon switching to average valuation she becomes a buyer $b_i$ seeking to buy the asset back and deliver it to her lender.

\text{INSERT TABLE II SOMEWHERE HERE}\n
We denote by $\mathcal{T}$ the set of agent types and by $\tau$ a generic type. Because the set of types is large, the description of all possible transitions is somewhat tedious. While this description is necessary for understanding the workings and solution of the model, readers wishing to get to our results on equilibrium prices can skim over the rest of this section and proceed to Section III.B.
We describe the transitions between types using Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 describes transitions outside a repo contract, and Figure 3 transitions within a repo contract. The top part of Figure 2 concerns a high-valuation agent and is analogous to Figure 1. The agent is initially a buyer $b$, seeking a seller of either asset in the spot market. If he reverts to average valuation before meeting a seller, he exits the market. Otherwise, if he meets a seller of asset $i \in \{1, 2\}$, he bargains over the price $p_i$ and buys the asset. He then becomes a lender $\ell_i$ of asset $i$ in the repo market, seeking a borrower. If he reverts to average valuation before meeting a borrower, he exits the repo market and becomes a seller $s_i$ of asset $i$ in the spot market. Upon meeting a buyer, he bargains over the price $p_i$, sells the asset, and exits the market. If instead the lender $\ell_i$ meets a borrower and there are gains from trade, he bargains over the lending fee $w_i$ and enters in a repo contract (where he can be type $\ell_s$, $\ell_{ni}$, or $\ell_{bi}$).

The bottom part of Figure 2 concerns a low-valuation agent who is initially a borrower $b_0$, seeking a lender in the repo market. If she reverts to average valuation before meeting a lender, she exits the market. Otherwise, if she meets a lender of asset $i$ and there are gains from trade, she bargains over the lending fee $w_i$ and enters in a repo contract (where she can be type $s_i$, $n_i$, or $b_i$).

Consider next the transitions within a repo contract, described in Figure 3. A repo contract can be terminated by either the borrower or the lender, but in different ways. The borrower (lower dashed box) can terminate by delivering the same asset she borrowed, while the lender (upper dashed box) can terminate by asking for instant delivery. Terminations are described by the arrows leaving the dashed boxes, with solid arrows corresponding to borrower-driven terminations, and dotted arrows to lender-driven ones.

A borrower terminates the contract when she is a buyer $b_i$ and meets a seller. She can also terminate when she reverts to average valuation before selling the asset, i.e., while being a seller $s_i$. In both cases, she delivers the asset and exits the market, while the lender returns to the pool $\ell_i$ of lenders.

A lender terminates the contract when he reverts to average valuation. If the borrower has the asset in hand because she is of type $s_i$, she delivers it instantly. The lender then becomes a
seller \( \bar{i} \), while the borrower returns to the pool \( \bar{b} \) of borrowers. If the borrower does not have the asset because she sold it and is of type \( \bar{i} \) or \( \bar{b} \), instant delivery is impossible because of search. In that event, we assume that the lender seizes some cash collateral previously posted by the borrower and exits the market.\(^{14}\) The borrower returns to the pool \( \bar{b} \) of borrowers if she still wishes to hold a short position (type \( \bar{n} \)), and exits the market otherwise (type \( \bar{b} \)).

We denote by \( \mu_{bi} \) the measure of buyers of asset \( i \) (types \( \bar{b} \) and \( \bar{b} \)), by \( \mu_{si} \) the measure of sellers of asset \( i \) (types \( \bar{s} \) and \( \bar{s} \)), and by \( \mu_{\tau} \) the measure of agents of type \( \tau \in \mathcal{T} \). The measures \( \{\mu_{\tau}\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}} \) are determined by two sets of conditions: market-clearing and inflow-outflow. Market-clearing requires that all assets are held by some agents, and that there is an equal measure of high- and low-valuation agents involved in repo contracts. Inflow-outflow conditions require that the inflow into a type is equal to the outflow, where inflows and outflows are determined by the transitions described in Figures 2 and 3. In Appendix B we derive the market-clearing and inflow-outflow conditions, and show that the resulting system determines uniquely the measures of all types.

**B. Bargaining and Prices**

Prices are the outcome of pairwise bargaining between buyers and sellers, and lending fees are the outcome of bargaining between borrowers and lenders. Bargaining in the repo market is as in Section II.B: a repo transaction occurs whenever there is a positive surplus, and the lender receives a fraction \( \theta \in [0, 1] \) of the surplus. Bargaining in the spot market is more complicated than in Section II.A because for each asset \( i \) there are two buyer types, \( \bar{b} \) and \( \bar{b} \), and two seller types, \( \bar{s} \) and \( \bar{s} \). We denote by \( \Delta_{\tau} \) the reservation value of type \( \tau \), defined as the difference in utility between owning and not owning the asset. Since type \( \bar{b} \) receives a hedging benefit from holding the asset while type \( \bar{s} \) does not, reservation values satisfy \( \Delta_{\bar{b}} > \Delta_{\bar{s}} \). They also satisfy \( \Delta_{\bar{b}i} > \Delta_{\bar{s}i} \) since type \( \bar{s} \) receives a hedging benefit from holding a short position while type \( \bar{b} \) does not. For simplicity, we also assume that

\[
\Delta_{\bar{b}i} > \Delta_{\bar{b}} > \Delta_{\bar{s}i} > \Delta_{\bar{s}} \tag{1}
\]

i.e., short-sellers are the infra-marginal traders, both as sellers and as buyers. Eq. (1) is satisfied under appropriate restrictions on exogenous parameters, as we show in Section III.C.\(^{15}\) We assume that all buyer-seller meetings result in the same price \( p_i \). The price must lie between the valuation of the marginal buyer and the marginal seller, i.e.,

\[
p_i = \phi \Delta_{\bar{s}i} + (1 - \phi) \Delta_{\bar{b}} \tag{2}
\]
for some $\phi \in [0, 1]$. The parameter $\phi$ measures the buyers’ bargaining power, and we treat it as exogenous.$^{16}$

To determine the prices and lending fees, we need to compute agents’ reservation values. These can be derived from the utilities associated to each type. The utilities satisfy the usual flow-value equations: denoting by $V_\tau$ the utility of being type $\tau$, the flow value $r V_\tau$ is equal to the flow benefits accruing to $\tau$ plus the utility derived from the probability of transitions to other types. In Appendix C we derive the flow-value equations and solve for the prices and lending fees.

C. Equilibrium

An equilibrium is characterized by types’ measures $\{\mu_\tau\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}}$, types’ utilities $\{V_\tau\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}}$, prices and lending fees $\{p_i, w_i\}_{i=1,2}$, and short-selling decisions $\{\nu_i\}_{i=1,2}$ where $\nu_i \equiv \nu$ if low-valuation agents borrow asset $i$ and $\nu_i \equiv 0$ otherwise. These variables solve a system of equations: market-clearing and inflow-outflow equations (B3)-(B11) for the measures, flow-value equations (C1)-(C10) for the utilities, equations (C11) and (C12) for the prices and lending fees, and equation

$$\nu_i = \nu \Leftrightarrow \Sigma_i \geq 0,$$

for the short-selling decisions, where $\Sigma_i$ is the surplus associated to a repo transaction. Eq. (3) states that a borrower and a lender agree to a repo transaction for asset $i$ only if the transaction involves positive surplus. A solution to the system of equations is an equilibrium if it satisfies two additional requirements. First, the conjectured trading strategies are optimal, i.e., high- and low-valuation agents follow the strategies implicit in Figures 2 and 3, and average-valuation agents hold no position. Second, the buyers’ and sellers’ reservation values are ordered as in (1).

Computing an equilibrium can, in general, be done only numerically. Fortunately, however, closed-form solutions can be derived when search frictions are small, i.e., $\lambda$ and $\nu$ are large.$^{17}$ In the remainder of this section we focus on this case, emphasizing the intuitions gained by the closed-form solutions. We complement our asymptotic analysis with a numerical calibration in Section V. Given that assets are symmetric, a natural equilibrium is one in which low-valuation agents borrow both assets. Proposition 5 shows that a symmetric equilibrium exists.

**Proposition 5.** Suppose that $\phi, \theta \neq 1$ and

$$\pi - 2y + \frac{K}{r + \overline{r} + g_s} (\pi - 2y) > 0,$$

(4)
where $g_s$ is defined by (B14). Then, for large $\lambda$ and $\nu$, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which low-valuation agents borrow both assets. Prices, lending fees, and population measures are identical across assets.

We derive closed-form solutions for prices and lending fees in Proposition 6, but first we introduce some notation. We denote by $m_b$ the measure of buyers of asset $i$ in the limit when search frictions go to zero. (For simplicity, we suppress the asset subscript in the symmetric equilibrium.) Assumption 2 implies that buyers are the “long” side of the spot market because the asset demand generated by high-valuation agents exceeds the asset supply generated by issuers and short-sellers. Therefore, the measure of buyers converges to a non-zero limit when search frictions vanish, i.e., $m_b > 0$. The same is true for the measure of lenders, which converges the asset supply $S$, the Walrasian limit. The rates at which buyers and lenders can contact sellers and borrowers converge to finite limits: if the limits were infinite, the measures of buyers and lenders would converge to zero. Denoting the limit rates by $g_s$ and $g_{bo}$, the measures of sellers and borrowers are asymptotically equal to $g_s/\lambda$ and $g_{bo}/\nu$, respectively, and converge to zero when search frictions vanish. Closed-form solutions for $(m_b, g_s, g_{bo})$ are in Appendix B (Eqs. (B13)-(B15)) and they imply intuitive comparative statics. For example, the measure $m_b$ of buyers is increasing in the inflow $F$ of high-valuation agents (longs) and decreasing in the inflow $F$ of low-valuation agents (shorts). Conversely, the measure $g_s/\lambda$ of sellers is decreasing in $F$ and increasing in $F$, and the measure $g_{bo}/\nu$ of borrowers is increasing in $F$.

**Proposition 6.** In the symmetric equilibrium of Proposition 5, both assets $i \in \{1, 2\}$ have the same price which is asymptotically equal to

$$
p = \frac{\delta + \pi - y}{r} - \frac{\kappa}{\lambda m_b} r + \frac{\phi(r + \pi + 2g_s) \pi}{\lambda(1 - \phi)m_b} r + \frac{g_{bo}}{r + \pi + \kappa + \frac{g_s}{\lambda} + g_{bo} \Sigma} \frac{w}{r},
$$

and the same lending fee which is asymptotically equal to

$$
w = \theta \left( r + \pi + \frac{g_s}{r + \pi + \kappa + g_s} + g_{bo} \right) \Sigma,
$$

where

$$\Sigma = \frac{x - 2y + \kappa (\pi - 2y)}{2\nu(1 - \theta)S}.$$
The price is the sum of four terms. The first is the limit when search frictions go to zero, and coincides with the Walrasian price of Propositions 1 and 3. The remaining terms are adjustments to the Walrasian price due to search frictions. The second term is a liquidity discount arising because high-valuation buyers expect to incur a search cost when seeking to unwind their long positions. This cost reduces their valuation and lowers the price. The liquidity discount decreases in the measure \( m_b \) of buyers because this reduces the time to sell the asset, and increases in the rate \( \kappa \) of reversion to average valuation because this reduces the investment horizon. Interpreting the search cost as a transaction cost, the liquidity discount is in the spirit of Amihud and Mendelson (1986).\(^{18}\)

The third term is a discount arising because search precludes Bertrand competition between buyers, thus allowing them to extract surplus from sellers. This “bargaining” discount decreases in the measure \( m_b \) of buyers because with more buyers the bargaining position of each individual buyer worsens. Conversely, the bargaining discount increases in the rate \( g_s \) at which buyers can contact sellers.

The last term is a specialness premium, arising because high-valuation agents can earn a fee by lending the asset in the repo market. As in Proposition 4, lenders do not compete the fee down to zero because the search friction enables them to extract some of the borrowers’ short-selling surplus \( \Sigma \). The fee is an additional cash flow derived from the asset and raises its price. Both the lending fee and the specialness premium increase in the rate \( g_{bo} \) at which lenders can contact borrowers because with more borrowers, lenders are in a better bargaining position.

The short-selling surplus \( \Sigma \) increases in the hedging benefit \( x \) of the low-valuation agents. It also increases in the contact rate \( g_s \) of sellers: the easier sellers are to contact, the more attractive a short-sale becomes to a low-valuation agent because it is easier to buy the asset back.

Propositions 7 and 8 establish our main result: the basic mechanism explained at the beginning of Section III creates asymmetric equilibria in which short-selling activity is concentrated in one asset that trades at a higher price.

**Proposition 7.** Suppose that \( \phi \neq 1, \theta \neq 0, 1, \) and (4) holds. Then, for large \( \lambda \) and \( \nu \), there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in which short-selling is concentrated in asset 1.

To present the solutions for prices and lending fees, we introduce notation analogous to that in the symmetric equilibrium. We denote by \( \hat{m}_{bi} \) the limit measure of buyers of asset \( i \), by \( \hat{g}_{si} \) the limit contact rate of sellers of asset \( i \), and by \( \hat{g}_{bo} \) the limit contact rate of borrowers. Closed-form solutions for these variables are in Appendix B (Eqs. (B16)-(B20)), and they satisfy \( \hat{m}_{b1} > \hat{m}_{b2} \).
and $\hat{g}_{s1} > \hat{g}_{s2}$, i.e., asset 1 has more buyers and sellers than asset 2.

**Proposition 8.** In the asymmetric equilibrium of Proposition 7, asset prices are asymptotically equal to

$$p_1 = \frac{\delta + \pi - y}{r} - \frac{\kappa}{\lambda \hat{m}_{b1}} \frac{\pi}{r} - \frac{\phi}{\lambda(1 - \phi)} \left[ \frac{r + \kappa + \hat{g}_{s1}}{\hat{m}_{b1}} + \frac{\hat{g}_{s2}}{\hat{m}_{b2}} \right] \frac{\pi}{r} + \frac{\hat{g}_{b0}}{r} \frac{\hat{g}_{s1} \hat{m}_{b1} + \hat{g}_{s2} \hat{m}_{b2} + \hat{g}_{b0}}{r} \left[ r + \kappa + \frac{\hat{g}_{s1}}{\hat{m}_{b1}} + \frac{\hat{g}_{s2}}{\hat{m}_{b2}} \right] \frac{\pi}{r},$$

and

$$p_2 = \frac{\delta + \pi - y}{r} - \frac{\kappa}{\lambda \hat{m}_{b2}} \frac{\pi}{r} - \frac{\phi}{\lambda(1 - \phi)} \left[ \frac{r + \kappa + \hat{g}_{s2}}{\hat{m}_{b2}} + \frac{\hat{g}_{s1}}{\hat{m}_{b1}} \right] \frac{\pi}{r}.$$

The lending fee for asset 1 is asymptotically equal to

$$w_1 = \theta \left( r + \kappa + \frac{\hat{g}_{s1}}{r + \kappa + \hat{g}_{s1}} + \frac{\hat{g}_{b0}}{r} \right) \Sigma_1,$$

where

$$\Sigma_1 = \frac{\pi \theta r\kappa + \frac{\pi \theta r\kappa}{r + \hat{g}_{s1}} (\pi - 2y)}{\nu(1 - \theta)S}.$$

An immediate consequence of Proposition 8 is that the price of asset 1 exceeds that of asset 2. This is because of three effects working in the same direction. First, the liquidity discount is smaller for asset 1 because this asset has a larger buyer pool, i.e., $\hat{m}_{b1} > \hat{m}_{b2}$. Second, the bargaining discount is smaller for asset 1 because the larger buyer pool implies more outside options for sellers. Finally, asset 1 carries a specialness premium because unlike asset 2 it can be lent to short-sellers.

The results of Propositions 7 and 8 can shed light on several puzzling aspects of the on-the-run phenomenon. At a basic level, they can explain why assets with almost identical payoffs, such as on- and off-the-run bonds, can trade at different prices. Our results can also rationalize the apparent paradox that off-the-run bonds are generally viewed as “scarce” and hard to locate, while at the same time being cheaper than on-the-run bonds. We show that off-the-run bonds are indeed scarce from the viewpoint of short-sellers seeking to buy and deliver them. Because, however, scarcity drives short-sellers away from these bonds, it makes them less liquid and less attractive to marginal buyers who are the agents seeking to establish long positions. Finally, our results have
the surprising implication that the trading activity of short-sellers can raise, rather than lower, an asset’s price. This is because short-sellers increase both the asset’s liquidity and specialness.

We next compare the symmetric and asymmetric equilibria.

Proposition 9. In the asymmetric equilibrium of Proposition 7:

(i) There are more buyers and sellers of asset 1 than in the symmetric equilibrium.

(ii) There are fewer buyers and sellers of asset 2 than in the symmetric equilibrium.

(iii) The lending fee of asset 1 is higher than in the symmetric equilibrium.

(iv) The prices of the two assets straddle the symmetric-equilibrium price when \( \phi = 0 \). For other values of \( \phi \) (e.g., 1/2), both prices can exceed the symmetric-equilibrium price.

Since in the asymmetric equilibrium short-selling is concentrated in asset 1, there are more sellers of this asset than in the symmetric equilibrium. There are also more buyers because of the short-sellers who need to buy the asset back. Conversely, asset 2 attracts fewer buyers and sellers than in the symmetric equilibrium.

The lending fee of asset 1 is higher than in the symmetric equilibrium because of two effects. First, because there are more buyers and sellers of asset 1, a short-sale is easier to execute, and the short-selling surplus is higher. Moreover, lenders of asset 1 are in better position to bargain for this surplus because they do not have to compete with lenders of asset 2.

To explain the price results, we recall that prices differ from the Walrasian benchmark because of a liquidity discount, a bargaining discount, and a specialness premium. In the asymmetric equilibrium, asset 1’s liquidity discount is smaller than in the symmetric equilibrium because there are more buyers. Moreover, asset 1’s specialness premium is higher because of the higher lending fee. Conversely, asset 2’s liquidity discount is higher than in the symmetric equilibrium, and its specialness premium is zero. Therefore, absent the bargaining discount, i.e., when the buyers’ bargaining power \( \phi \) is zero, asset 1 trades at a higher price and asset 2 at a lower price relative to the symmetric equilibrium. Quite surprisingly, however, both assets can trade at a higher price because of the bargaining discount. To explain the intuition, we recall that short-sellers exit the seller pool faster when the asset they have borrowed has a larger buyer pool. This occurs in the asymmetric equilibrium because asset 1 has more buyers than either asset in the symmetric equilibrium. Therefore, there are fewer short-sellers in the asymmetric equilibrium, and the aggregate
seller pool can be smaller. This can worsen the buyers’ bargaining position and raise the prices of both assets.

D. Arbitrage

Since asset prices differ in the asymmetric equilibrium, a natural question is whether there exists a profitable arbitrage. Our analysis so far does not address this question because agents are restricted to hold either long or short positions. In this section we introduce an additional agent group, the “arbitrageurs,” who in addition to portfolios allowed to other agents, can hold an arbitrage portfolio that is one share long and one short. We assume that arbitrageurs have average valuation and never switch to high or low. Consistent with the risk-aversion interpretation of utility flows, we set the flow from an arbitrage portfolio to zero. Finally, we assume that arbitrageurs are in infinite measure so that they can hold an unlimited collective position. Proposition 10 shows that the asymmetric equilibrium can be robust to the presence of arbitrageurs.

Proposition 10. Consider the asymmetric equilibrium of Proposition 7. If \( \nu/\lambda \in (n_1, n_2) \) for two positive constants \( n_1, n_2 \), then arbitrageurs find it optimal to stay out of the market.

To explain why arbitrage can be unprofitable, suppose that an arbitrageur attempts to profit from the price differential by buying asset 2 and shorting asset 1. This strategy is unprofitable if

\[
p_1 - p_2 < \frac{w_1}{r},
\]

i.e., the price differential does not exceed the PV of asset 1’s lending fee. The price differential depends on the lending fee through the specialness premium. Therefore, to check whether (12) holds, we need to substitute the equilibrium values of \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \) from Proposition 8:

\[
\frac{(\phi r + \kappa)}{\lambda(1 - \phi)} \left[ \frac{1}{m_{b2}} - \frac{1}{m_{b1}} \right] \frac{\bar{\epsilon}}{r} + \frac{\hat{g}_{b2}}{r + \kappa + \kappa + \kappa + \kappa + \hat{g}_{s1} + \hat{g}_{bo}} \frac{w_1}{r} < \frac{w_1}{r}.
\]

The first term on the left-hand side reflects asset 1’s lower liquidity and bargaining discounts relative to asset 2, and we refer to it as asset 1’s liquidity premium. By buying asset 2 and shorting asset 1, an arbitrageur capitalizes on this premium. The arbitrageur also capitalizes on the specialness premium, which is the second term on the left-hand side. Crucially, however, the specialness premium is only a fraction of the cost \( w_1/r \) of the arbitrage because lenders cannot ensure that their asset is on loan continuously. Thus, (12) is satisfied when the lending fee is large enough.
Consider next the opposite strategy of buying asset 1 and shorting asset 2. In the proof of Proposition 10 we show that this strategy is unprofitable if

\[
\frac{\hat{g}_{bo}}{r + \kappa \frac{g_{s1}}{r + \frac{1}{2} + g_{s1}}} + \frac{w_1}{\hat{g}_{bo}} \leq p_1 - p_2. \tag{13}
\]

The left-hand side is the arbitrageur’s fee income from lending asset 1 in the repo market. This exceeds the specialness premium (included in \(p_1 - p_2\)) because the arbitrageur can hold asset 1 forever, thus being a better lender than a sequence of high-valuation agents. Because, however, the arbitrageur loses on the liquidity premium (the remaining part of \(p_1 - p_2\)), (13) is satisfied when the lending fee is not too large. In the proof of Proposition 10 we show that (12) and (13) are jointly satisfied when the ratio \(\nu/\lambda\) of relative frictions in the spot and the repo market lies in some interval \((n_1, n_2)\). This interval can be quite large as evidenced by the calibration exercise in Section V.23

E. Equilibrium Selection

Our model has two identical asymmetric equilibria: one in which short-sellers concentrate in asset 1 and one in which they concentrate in asset 2. The mere existence of multiple equilibria is reminiscent of Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1991) and Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1993) who document that in the Japanese government-bond market, liquidity concentrates in an arbitrary “benchmark” bond. In the US Treasury market, however, multiple equilibria do not explain why short-sellers concentrate systematically in the on- rather than the off-the-run bond. In this section we explore this issue by considering the case where asset supplies differ. Without loss of generality, we take asset 1 to be in larger supply, i.e., \(S_1 > S_2\).

Proposition 11. As \(\lambda\) and \(\nu\) become large:

(i) An equilibrium where short-selling is concentrated in asset 1 exists for all values of \(S_1 - S_2\).

(ii) An equilibrium where short-selling is concentrated in asset 2 exists for a set of values of \(S_1 - S_2\) that converges to \([0, \hat{S}]\) with \(\hat{S} > 0\).

(iii) An equilibrium where low-valuation agents short-sell both assets exists for a set of values of \(S_1 - S_2\) that converges to \(\{0\}\).
Proposition 11 shows that asset supply is a natural device in selecting among equilibria. For small search frictions, the symmetric equilibrium ceases to exist as long as asset supplies differ. Moreover, if the difference exceeds \( \hat{S} \), the equilibrium in which short-sellers concentrate in asset 2 ceases to exist as well. The only remaining equilibrium is that short-sellers concentrate in asset 1. Intuitively, short-sellers prefer the asset with the larger seller pool because they can buy it back more easily. Since asset 1 is in larger supply, it has more owners who eventually turn into sellers. If the supply difference \( S_1 - S_2 \) is large enough, this effect makes the seller pool of asset 1 larger than the seller pool of asset 2, even if all short-sellers were to concentrate in asset 2. Therefore, if \( S_1 - S_2 \) is large enough, the equilibrium in which short-sellers concentrate in asset 2 does not exist.

Proposition 11 is a first step towards reconciling our theory based on multiple equilibria with the empirical fact that liquidity in the US Treasury market concentrates systematically in just-issued bonds. Indeed, a commonly-held view is that a bond’s effective supply decreases over time as the bond becomes “locked away” in the portfolios of buy-and-hold investors (see Amihud and Mendelson (1991)). Our theory cannot explain the decrease in effective supply since there are no auction-cycle dynamics. Proposition 11 suggests, however, that if off-the-run bonds are indeed in smaller effective supply, they are less likely to attract short-sellers and for that reason less liquid.

IV. Empirical Implications

In this section we explore the comparative statics of our model and draw empirical implications. We examine how liquidity, specialness, and the price premium depend on the extent of short-selling activity and on assets’ supplies (i.e., issue sizes). We measure asset \( i \)’s specialness by the ratio \( w_i/p_i \) of the lending fee to the price, the price premium by \( p_1 - p_2 \), and the short-selling activity by the flow \( F \) of short-sellers entering the market. Liquidity can be measured by search times, but these can differ for buyers and sellers. To condense search times into an one-dimensional measure, we multiply the expected search time for buying asset \( i \) with that for selling the asset, and take the inverse. This measure has the advantage of being equal, up to the multiplicative constant \( \lambda \), to asset \( i \)’s trading volume, i.e., the flow of matches \( \lambda \mu_{bi} \mu_{si} \) between buyers and sellers.\(^{24}\)

**Proposition 12.** Consider the asymmetric equilibrium in which short-selling is concentrated in asset 1, and suppose that \( \lambda \) and \( \nu \) are large.

(i) If the flow \( F \) of short-sellers increases, then asset 1’s liquidity increases, asset 2’s liquidity stays constant, asset 1’s specialness increases, and the price premium increases.
(ii) If the supply $S_1$ of asset 1 decreases, holding asset 2’s supply $S_2$ constant, then asset 1’s liquidity decreases, asset 2’s liquidity stays constant, asset 1’s specialness can increase or decrease, and the price premium can increase or decrease.

Result (i) is one of our theory’s main implications: short-selling activity drives both the superior liquidity of on-the-run bonds and their specialness. By concentrating in asset 1, short-sellers increase that asset’s trading volume and liquidity. They also generate specialness because they demand asset 1 in the repo market. Liquidity and specialness raise asset 1’s price above that of asset 2. These results are consistent with empirical studies. Jordan and Jordan (1997) provide a case study where short-seller demand for a particular Treasury note generated a large price premium. Krishnamurthy (2002) measures short-seller demand by the issuance of corporate and agency bonds, arguing that dealers short Treasuries to hedge their inventories. He finds that issuance is positively related to the on-the-run premium. Graveline and McBrady (2007) emphasize the role of short-seller demand using a conceptual framework very similar to ours. They construct several measures of demand, attempting to get both at the hedging and the speculative component. They find that short-seller demand is the strongest determinant of specialness once variation related to the auction cycle is taken out. Moulton (2004) also finds evidence linking short-selling demand to specialness.

In linking the liquidity of the spot market to short-selling activity, we are also linking it to the liquidity of the repo market. Indeed, the asset in which short-sellers concentrate has high trading volume both in the spot and in the repo market. The empirical evidence supports such a link. For example, Barclay, Hendershott, and Kotz (2006) show that when on-the-run bonds become off-the-run, it is not only volume in the spot market that drops, but also volume in the repo market.

Result (ii) shows that a decrease in asset 1’s supply decreases liquidity, but can increase or decrease specialness. Specialness can increase because of a scarcity effect in the repo market: since there are fewer lenders of asset 1, they can extract a higher fee from short-sellers. There is, however, an offsetting scarcity effect in the spot market: because there are fewer sellers of asset 1, the asset is harder to deliver. This reduces short-sellers’ willingness to borrow the asset, and can reduce the lending fee that lenders are able to extract. Furthermore, if supply drops below a threshold, an equilibrium with short-seller concentration in asset 1 is not possible, as shown in Proposition 11. Short-sellers migrate to asset 2, and asset 1’s specialness drops discontinuously.

Result (ii) can help interpret the variation of liquidity and specialness over the auction cycle. Graveline and McBrady (2007) document that specialness increases while a bond is on-the-run,
but drops discontinuously with the issuance of the new bond. At the same time, Fleming (2002) documents that liquidity decreases steadily with time from issuance. Suppose for reasons outside our model, that a bond’s effective supply decreases over time as the bond becomes “locked away” in the portfolios of buy-and-hold investors. Then the bond’s liquidity decreases, but specialness can increase as the bond becomes scarcer in the repo market. Eventually, however, specialness drops because short-sellers migrate to the new bond, which is easier to buy in the spot market.\(^{26}\)

More broadly, Result (ii) can reconcile our model with the empirical fact that liquidity and specialness do not always move in the same direction. For example, a sudden decrease in a bond’s effective supply (such as a short squeeze) can lead to a jump up in specialness but a drop in liquidity. Of course, our model cannot fully address such phenomena because it is stationary. A comprehensive time-series analysis would require modelling auction-cycle dynamics and/or stochastic shocks.

V. Calibration

In this section we perform a calibration exercise, and show that our model can generate significant price effects even for short search times. We also use the calibrated model to quantify the relative contribution of liquidity and specialness in the on-the-run spread. Our model involves fifteen exogenous parameters listed in Table III. We argue that a number of these parameters can be calibrated using Treasury-market data such as spot and repo trading activity and returns on Treasury securities. Other parameters, however, are harder to calibrate, and we comment on our choices and their impact on the calibration results. We also point out that parameters are constrained not only by the calibration targets, but also by several model-implied restrictions such as Assumptions 1 and 2.

For the calibration we extend the model to more than two assets. This provides a more accurate description of the US Treasury market, where there is one on-the-run and multiple off-the-run securities for each maturity range. With multiple assets there is again an equilibrium in which short-sellers concentrate in one asset, e.g., asset 1. To compute this equilibrium for the purpose of calibration, we do not rely on the asymptotic closed-form solutions of Section III.C. Instead, we use a numerical algorithm that solves the exact system of equations and checks that arbitrage is unprofitable.

INSERT TABLE III SOMEWHERE HERE
We set the number of assets to $I = 20$, consistent with the fact that on-the-run bonds account for about 5% of the Treasury market capitalization (Dupont and Sack (1999)). We assume that all assets are in identical supply $S$. We normalize the total supply $IS$ to one, without loss of generality: (B1)-(B5) and (B8)-(B12) show that if $(S, F, E, 1/\lambda, 1/\nu)$ are scaled by the same factor, the meeting intensities of each investor type stay the same.

As in the case of two assets, we assume that demand exceeds supply, generalizing Assumption 2 to $F/\kappa > IS + F/\kappa$. We select $(F, F)$ to make this an approximate equality; otherwise for small frictions, search times for sellers would be much shorter than for buyers. We use the second degree of freedom in $(F, F)$ to match the level of short-selling activity. Namely, in our calibration the amount of ongoing repo agreements for asset 1 is about seven times the asset’s issue size (Table IV), which is within reasonable range.\(^{27}\)

The expected investment horizons $1/\kappa$ and $1/\kappa$ are chosen to match turnover. Sundaresan (2002) and Strebulaev (2007) report that on-the-run bonds trade about ten times more than their off-the-run counterparts. Since the entire stock of Treasury securities turns over in less than three weeks (Dupont and Sack (1999)), on-the-run bonds turn over in about two-thirds of a day, and off-the-run bonds in about 125 days.\(^{28}\) In our model the turnover of off-the-run bonds is generated by high-valuation investors. We let $1/\kappa = 0.5$ years, i.e., 125 trading days, implying a turnover time of about the same (Table IV). The turnover of on-the-run bonds is generated mainly by short-sellers. We let $1/\kappa = 0.025$ years, i.e., about six trading days. Such a short horizon could be reasonable for dealers in corporate bonds or mortgage-backed securities who have transitory needs to hedge inventory. For our chosen value of $\kappa$, asset 1 turns over in 0.88 days, and its volume relative to the aggregate of the other assets is 7.5 (Table IV).\(^{29}\) This is lower than the actual value of ten, but one could argue that short-selling is not the only factor driving the large relative volume of on-the-run bonds. Furthermore, raising the relative volume by increasing $\kappa$ would strengthen our results because the lending fee would increase.

The contact-intensity parameters $\lambda$ and $\nu$ are chosen based on agents’ search times. Possible proxies for the latter are the time it takes investors to find a dealer with a good quote, or the time it takes dealers to rebalance their inventory in the inter-dealer market. While these proxies are difficult to measure (and to map in our model which does not include dealers), intuition suggests that search times should be short, in the order of a few hours or minutes. The search times implied
by our chosen values for $\lambda$ and $\nu$ are reported in Table IV. Assuming ten trading hours per day,$^{30}$ it takes 12 minutes to sell the “on-the-run” asset 1 and 2.7 hours to buy it. Each “off-the-run” asset $i \in \{2, \ldots, I\}$ can be sold in 2.7 hours and bought in 2.31 days. While the time to buy might seem long, all off-the-run issues in our model are perfect substitutes for their buyers, who are the high-valuation agents. Therefore, a buyer’s effective search time does not exceed $2.31/(I-1) = 0.12$ days. Finally, it takes 42 minutes to borrow asset 1 in the repo market and 8.7 hours to lend it. The time to lend the on-the-run asset might seem long but could be interpreted as an average across asset owners, some of whom do not engage in asset lending in practice. Our calibration results are sensitive to the choice of $\nu$: a smaller value of $\nu$ implies longer search times for borrowers, less competition between lenders, and a larger lending fee and specialness premium.$^{31}$

The bargaining-power parameters $\phi$ and $\theta$ are set to 0.5 so that all agents are symmetric. The riskless rate $r$ is set to 4%, consistent with Ibbotson (2004)’s average T-bill rate of 3.8% during the period 1926-2002. Given that prices and lending fees are linear in $(\delta, \overline{p}, \overline{x}, y)$, we set $\delta = 1$ and report relative prices (e.g., $\delta/p, w/p$). We select $\overline{p}$ and $y$ based on assets’ risk premia, measured by the difference $\delta/p_i - r$ between expected returns and the riskless rate. For $\overline{p} = 0.4$ and $y = 0.5$, risk premia are about 2% (Table V), consistent with Ibbotson (2004)’s average excess return of long-term bonds over bills of 1.9% per year during the period 1926-2002.$^{32}$

The remaining parameter is $\overline{x}$, the hedging benefit of low-valuation agents. Our calibration results are sensitive to this parameter: a larger value of $\overline{x}$ raises the utility that low-valuation agents derive from a short position, and this raises the lending fee and the specialness premium. Our model implies several restrictions on $\overline{x}$. For example, short-sales can involve a positive surplus only if $\overline{x} > 2y - \overline{r} = 0.8$ (Assumption 1). Moreover, short-sellers are the infra-marginal traders (Eq. (1)) if $\overline{x} \geq 1.03$. On the other hand, under the CARA-based foundation of our model, $\overline{x}$ must not exceed $4y - \overline{r} = 1.6$ (Assumption 3, online Appendix E); otherwise low-valuation agents would prefer to short more than one share. When $\overline{x}$ takes the largest value in the interval $[1.03, 1.6]$, our model generates empirically plausible price effects (Table V). The difference in expected returns between the two assets is 50bps, consistent with Warga (1992) who reports that on-the-run portfolios return 55bps below matched off-the-run portfolios.$^{33}$ The specialness is 35bps, consistent with Duffie (1996) who reports a specialness difference of 40bps between on- and off-the-run bonds.$^{34}$

Given the lack of direct evidence on $\overline{x}$, it is difficult to ascertain whether a value close to 1.6 is
more plausible than a smaller value, so the success of our calibration exercise should be qualified. We should emphasize, however, that matching the empirical data is not an obvious result: values of $x$ matching the data must also satisfy the restrictions mentioned in the previous paragraph and be such that arbitrage is unprofitable. An additional advantage of our calibration exercise is that we can examine the implications of the parameter choices matching the data for other quantities of interest. For example, we can evaluate the relative contribution of liquidity and specialness in the spread of Table V. Generalizing the decomposition in Section III.C, we find that the specialness premium accounts for 99% of the spread while the liquidity premium for only 1%. Of course, this does not mean that liquidity does not matter; it rather means that liquidity can have large effects because it induces short-seller concentration and creates specialness.

VI. Conclusion

This paper proposes a search-based theory of the on-the-run phenomenon. We argue that liquidity and specialness are not independent explanations of this phenomenon, but can be explained simultaneously by short-selling activity. Short-sellers in our model can endogenously concentrate in one of two identical assets because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed. That asset enjoys greater liquidity, measured by search times, and a higher lending fee (“specialness”). Moreover, liquidity and specialness translate into price premia which are consistent with no-arbitrage. We derive closed-form solutions in the realistic case of small frictions, and show that a calibration can generate effects of the observed magnitude.

While our analysis is motivated from the government-bond market, some lessons are more general. Perhaps the main lesson concerns the law of one price—a fundamental tenet of Finance. We show that this law can be violated in a significant manner in a model where all agents are rational but the trading mechanism is not Walrasian. Our search-based trading mechanism is of course an idealization, but it captures the bilateral nature of trading in over-the-counter markets. Furthermore, the search times that are needed to generate significant price differentials are small, in the order of a few hours. For such times, it is unclear whether the search framework is a worse description of over-the-counter markets than a Walrasian auction, which assumes multilateral trading.
Appendix

A. Proofs of Propositions 1-4

Proof of Proposition 1: At time $t$, an agent with valuation $x_t$ chooses an asset $i$ and a position $q$ in the asset to solve

$$\max_{i \in \{1,2\}} \max_{q \in \{0,1\}} \left[ q(\delta + x_t) - |q| y - q r p_i \right],$$

i.e., maximize the flow utility minus the time value of the position’s cost. In equilibrium, assets trade at the same price because otherwise no agent would demand a long position in the more expensive asset. Denoting by $p$ the common price, no agent would demand a long position in any asset if $r p > (\delta + \bar{p} - y)$. Conversely, if $r p < (\delta + \bar{p} - y)$, then high-valuation agents would demand long positions, which generates excess demand from Assumption 2. Therefore, $r p = (\delta + \bar{p} - y)$. Under this price, high-valuation agents are indifferent between a long and no position, and all other agents hold no position.

Proof of Proposition 2: In equilibrium, either high-valuation agents accept to buy asset $i$, or they refuse to do so and the asset is owned only by average-valuation agents. To nest the two cases, we define the variable $\lambda_i$ by $\lambda_i \equiv \lambda$ if high-valuation agents accept to buy asset $i$ and $\lambda_i \equiv 0$ otherwise. The utilities $V_b$, $V_{ni}$, and $V_{si}$ of being type $b$, $ni$, and $si$, respectively, are determined by the flow-value equations

$$r V_b = -\bar{\pi} V_b + \sum_{i=1}^{2} \lambda_i \mu_{si} \left( V_{ni} - p_i - V_b \right),$$

$$r V_{ni} = \delta + \bar{p} - y + \bar{\pi} \left( V_{ni} - V_{ni} \right),$$

$$r V_{si} = \delta - y + \lambda_i \mu_{bi} \left( p_i - V_{si} \right).$$

For example, (A2) equates the flow value $r V_b$ of being type $b$ to the flow benefits accruing to $b$ and the utility derived from the possibility of $b$ transiting to other types. The flow benefits are zero because $b$ does not own an asset. The transitions are (i) revert to average valuation at rate $\bar{\pi}$ and exit the market (utility zero and net utility $-V_b$), and (ii) meet a seller of asset $i \in \{1,2\}$ at rate $\lambda_i \mu_{si}$, buy at price $p_i$, and become a non-searcher $ni$ (utility $V_{ni}$ and net utility $V_{ni} - p_i - V_b$).

The price of asset $i$ is such that the buyer receives a fraction $\phi$ of the surplus $\hat{\Sigma}_i$. The buyer’s net utility from the transaction is $V_{ni} - p_i - V_b$ and the seller’s is $p_i - V_{ni}$. Therefore, the price
satisfies
\[ V_{ni} - p_i - V_b = \phi \hat{\Sigma}_i = \phi (V_{ni} - V_b - V_n) \Rightarrow p_i = \phi V_{ni} + (1 - \phi) (V_{ni} - V_b). \] (A5)

Equilibrium imposes that
\[ \lambda_i = \lambda \iff \hat{\Sigma}_i \geq 0, \] (A6)
i.e., high-valuation agents accept to buy asset \( i \) if this transaction generates a positive surplus \( \hat{\Sigma}_i \).

Subtracting (A2) and (A4) from (A3), and replacing \( p_i \) by (A5), we find
\[
(r + \pi)\hat{\Sigma}_i = \pi - \phi \sum_{j=1}^{2} \lambda_j \mu_{xj} \hat{\Sigma}_j - (1 - \phi) \lambda_i \mu_b \hat{\Sigma}_i. \] (A7)

If \( \lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = 0 \), (A7) implies that \( \hat{\Sigma}_i = \pi/(r + \pi) > 0 \), a contradiction. If \( \lambda_1 = \lambda \) and \( \lambda_2 = 0 \), (A7) implies that \( \hat{\Sigma}_2 > \hat{\Sigma}_1 > 0 \), again a contradiction. Therefore, the only possibility is that \( \lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = \lambda \), i.e., high-valuation agents accept to buy both assets. For \( \lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = \lambda \), the variables \((V_{ni}, V_{ni}, p_i, \hat{\Sigma}_i)\) are independent of \( i \), and thus the Law of One Price holds. ■

**Proof of Proposition 3:** The lending fee is zero by the argument preceding the proposition’s statement. Agents’ optimization problem is (A1) with the only difference that \( q \in \{-1, 0, 1\} \). Same arguments as in Proposition 1 imply that assets trade at the same price \( p \), such that \( rp \leq (\delta + \pi - y) \).

If \( rp < (\delta + \pi - y) \), then high-valuation agents would demand long positions, and average-valuation agents would not demand short positions from Assumption 1. This implies excess demand from Assumption 2, and thus \( rp = (\delta + \pi - y) \). Under this price, high-valuation agents are indifferent between a long and no position. Moreover, Assumption 1 implies that low-valuation agents hold short positions and average-valuation agents hold no position. ■

**Proof of Proposition 4:** If in equilibrium low-valuation agents refuse to borrow asset \( i \), the asset carries no lending fee, and its owners are high-valuation agents who sell when they switch to average valuation. If instead low-valuation agents accept to borrow asset \( i \), some owners can be average-valuation. Indeed, because the asset carries a positive lending fee, its owners might prefer not to terminate a repo contract when they switch to average valuation, but wait until the borrower wishes to terminate. To nest the two cases, we define the variable \( \nu_i \) by \( \nu_i \equiv \nu \) if low-valuation agents accept to borrow asset \( i \) and \( \nu_i \equiv 0 \) otherwise. We denote by \( V_{ni} \) the utility of a high-valuation agent seeking to lend asset \( i \), \( V_{ni} \) the utility of a high-valuation agent who is in a repo contract lending asset \( i \), \( V_{ni} \) the utility of an average-valuation agent who is in the same repo
contract and waits for the borrower to terminate, $V_{bo}$, the utility of a low-valuation agent seeking to borrow an asset, and $V_{ni}$, the utility of a low-valuation agent who is in a repo contract borrowing asset $i$. These utilities satisfy the flow-value equations

$$rV_{\ell i} = \delta + \pi - y + \pi (p_i - V_{\ell i}) + \nu_i \mu_{bo} (V_{\ell i} - V_{\ell i}), \quad (A8)$$

$$rV_{ni} = \delta - y + w_i + \kappa (p_i - V_{ni}), \quad (A9)$$

$$rV_{bo} = -\kappa V_{bo} + \sum_{i=1}^{2} \nu_i \mu_{li} (V_{ni} + p_i - V_{bo}). \quad (A10)$$

The remaining two equations depend on whether an owner terminates a repo contract immediately upon switching to average valuation, or whether he waits for the borrower to terminate. The condition for immediate termination is $p_i \geq V_{ni}$, and the equations in that case are

$$rV_{ni} = \delta + \pi - y + w_i + \pi (p_i - V_{ni}) + \kappa (V_{\ell i} - V_{ni}), \quad (A11)$$

$$rV_{2i} = -\delta + \pi - y - w_i + \pi (V_{bo} - p_i - V_{ni}) + \kappa (-p_i - V_{ni}). \quad (A12)$$

Eq. (A9) implies that $p_i \geq V_{ni}$ is equivalent to $\delta - y + w_i - \rho p_i \leq 0$. The latter condition is satisfied for small search frictions since $w_i \approx 0$ and $\rho p_i \approx \delta + \pi - y$. For brevity, we focus on the case $p_i \geq V_{ni}$ from now on, and treat the general case in online Appendix A.

To determine the price $p_i$, note that if $p_i > V_{\ell i}$, then high-valuation agents would not demand long positions, and neither would other agents with lower valuations. Conversely, if $p_i < V_{\ell i}$, then high-valuation agents would demand long positions. Since the measure of short-sellers does not exceed that of low-valuation agents (and is, in fact, strictly smaller because of the search friction), Assumption 2 implies excess demand for asset $i$. Therefore, $p_i = V_{\ell i}$. The lending fee $w_i$ is such that the lender receives a fraction $\theta \in [0,1]$ of the surplus $\Sigma_i$ in a repo transaction. Since a repo transaction turns the lender $\ell i$ into type $\pi i$, the lender’s surplus is $V_{\ell i} - V_{ni}$. The borrower’s surplus is $p_i + V_{ni} - V_{bo}$ because the borrower $bo$ sells the asset and becomes type $ni$. Therefore, the lending fee is implicitly defined by

$$V_{\pi i} - V_{\ell i} = \theta \Sigma_i = \theta (V_{\pi i} - V_{\ell i} + p_i + V_{2i} - V_{bo}). \quad (A13)$$

Finally, equilibrium imposes (3), i.e., low-valuation agents accept to borrow asset $i$ if this transaction generates a positive surplus $\Sigma_i$.

Since $p_i = V_{\ell i}$, the surplus is $\Sigma_i = V_{\pi i} + V_{2i} - V_{bo}$. Subtracting (A10) from the sum of (A11)
and (A12), and noting that (A13) implies $p_i + V_{ni} - V_{bo} = (1 - \theta)\Sigma_i$, we find:

$$(r + \pi + \kappa)\Sigma_i = \pi + x - 2y - (1 - \theta)\sum_{j=1}^{2} \nu_j \mu_{\ell j} \Sigma_j.$$  \hspace{1cm} (A14)

Eq. (A14) implies $\Sigma_1 = \Sigma_2 \equiv \Sigma$ and thus $\nu_1 = \nu_2$. If $\nu_1 = \nu_2 = 0$, then $\Sigma = (\pi + x - 2y)/(r + \pi + \kappa)$, which is positive by Assumption 1, a contradiction. Therefore, $\nu_1 = \nu_2 = \nu$, i.e., low-valuation agents accept to borrow both assets. For $\nu_1 = \nu_2 = \nu$, the variables $(V_{\ell i}, V_{ni}, p_i, w_i)$ are independent of $i$, and thus the Law of One Price holds.

\section*{B. Population Measures}

The measures $\mu_{bi}$ and $\mu_{si}$ of buyers and sellers of asset $i$ are

$$\mu_{bi} = \mu_{\ell i} + \mu_{ni}, \hspace{1cm} (B1)$$
$$\mu_{si} = \mu_{ni} + \mu_{si}. \hspace{1cm} (B2)$$

Since assets are held by either lenders or sellers, market clearing implies that

$$\mu_{\ell i} + \mu_{si} = S. \hspace{1cm} (B3)$$

Moreover, since there is equal measure of high- and low-valuation agents involved in repo contracts,

$$\mu_{\ell i} \equiv \mu_{\ell si} + \mu_{\ell ni} + \mu_{\ell bi} = \mu_{ni} + \mu_{si} + \mu_{bi}. \hspace{1cm} (B4)$$

To write the inflow-outflow equations, we condense types $(\ell si, \ell ni, \ell bi)$ into a type $\ell i$, and denote that type’s measure by $\mu_{\ell i}$ as in (B4) above. We also denote by $f_i$ the inflow from type $\ell i$ to type
The inflow-outflow equations are

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Buyers } \bar{b} & \quad \bar{F} = \bar{\kappa} \mu_{\bar{b}} + \sum_{i=1}^{2} \lambda \mu_{si} \mu_{\bar{b}} \\
\text{Lenders } \bar{t}_i & \quad \lambda \mu_{\bar{b}} \mu_{si} + f_i = \bar{\kappa} \mu_{t_i} + \nu_i \mu_{b_i} \mu_{t_i} \\
\text{Non-searchers } \bar{n}_i & \quad \nu_i \mu_{b_i} \mu_{t_i} = f_i + \bar{\kappa} \mu_{n_i} \\
\text{Sellers } \bar{s}_i & \quad \bar{\kappa} \mu_{t_i} + \bar{\kappa} \mu_{s_i} = \lambda \mu_{b_i} \mu_{s_i} \\
\text{Borrowers } \bar{b}_i & \quad \bar{F} + \sum_{i=1}^{2} \pi(\mu_{s_i} + \mu_{n_i}) = \kappa \mu_{b_0} + \sum_{i=1}^{2} \nu_i \mu_{b_i} \mu_{\bar{t}_i} \\
\text{Sellers } \bar{s}_i & \quad \nu_i \mu_{b_i} \mu_{t_i} = \bar{\kappa} \mu_{s_i} + \kappa \mu_{n_i} + \lambda \mu_{b_i} \mu_{s_i} \\
\text{Non-searchers } \bar{n}_i & \quad \lambda \mu_{b_i} \mu_{s_i} = \kappa \mu_{n_i} + \kappa \mu_{s_i} \\
\text{Buyers } \bar{b}_i & \quad \kappa \mu_{n_i} = \kappa \mu_{s_i} + \lambda \mu_{b_i} \mu_{s_i},
\end{align*}
\]

For example, (B5) equates the inflow into type \(\bar{b}\), which is \(\bar{F}\) because of the new entrants, to the outflow, which is the sum of (i) \(\bar{\kappa} \mu_{\bar{b}}\) because some buyers revert to average valuation and exit the market, and (ii) \(\sum_{i=1}^{2} \lambda \mu_{si} \mu_{\bar{b}}\) because some buyers meet with sellers.

We determine population measures by the system of (B1)-(B5) and (B8)-(B12). The total number of equations is 18 (because some are for each asset), and the 18 unknowns are the measures of the 14 types \(\bar{b}, \bar{b}_0, \{\bar{t}_i, \bar{n}_i, \bar{s}_i, \bar{n}_i, \bar{b}_i\}_{i \in \{1, 2\}}\) and \(\{\mu_{b_i}, \mu_{s_i}\}_{i \in \{1, 2\}}\). A solution to the system satisfies (B6) and (B7), which is why we do not include them into the system. Indeed, adding (B10)-(B12), and using (B4), we find

\[
\nu_i \mu_{b_i} \mu_{s_i} = \bar{\kappa} \mu_{s_i} + \kappa \mu_{n_i} + \lambda \mu_{b_i} \mu_{s_i}.
\]

Therefore, (B7) holds with \(f_i = \kappa \mu_{s_i} + \lambda \mu_{b_i} \mu_{s_i}\). For this value of \(f_i\), (B6) becomes \(\lambda \mu_{b_i} \mu_{s_i} + \kappa \mu_{s_i} = \bar{\kappa} \mu_{t_i} + \nu_i \mu_{b_i} \mu_{t_i}\), and is redundant because it can be derived by adding (B8) and (B10).

In online Appendix B we show that the system of (B1)-(B5) and (B8)-(B12) has a unique solution both in the symmetric case (\(\nu_1 = \nu_2 = 1\)) and in the asymmetric case (\(\nu_1 = 1, \nu_2 = 0\)). We also compute the solution for small search frictions. In the symmetric case the limit contact
rates of borrowers and sellers are

\[ g_{bo} = \frac{(\bar{\kappa} + \kappa)F}{2\kappa S} \] (B13)

\[ g_s = \frac{\bar{\kappa}S + \frac{\bar{\kappa} + \kappa}{2\kappa}F}{m_b} \] (B14)

and the limit measure \( m_b \) of buyers is the unique positive solution of

\[ 1 = \frac{F}{\bar{\kappa}m_b + 2\bar{\kappa}S + \frac{\bar{\kappa} + \kappa}{\kappa}F} + \frac{F}{2\bar{\kappa}m_b + 2\bar{\kappa}S + \frac{\bar{\kappa} + \kappa}{\kappa}F}. \] (B15)

In the asymmetric case the limit contact rates of borrowers and sellers are

\[ \hat{g}_{bo} = \frac{(\bar{\kappa} + \kappa)F}{\kappa S} \] (B16)

\[ \hat{g}_s \equiv \frac{\bar{\kappa}S + \frac{\bar{\kappa} + \kappa}{\kappa}F}{\hat{m}_b} \] (B17)

\[ \hat{g}_s \equiv \frac{\bar{\kappa}S}{\hat{m}_b} \] (B18)

and the limit measures of buyers are

\[ \hat{m}_b \equiv \frac{F - 2S - \frac{F}{\kappa}}{\bar{\kappa}} \] (B19)

\[ \hat{m}_b \equiv \frac{F - \bar{\kappa}S}{\bar{\kappa} + \hat{g}_s}. \] (B20)
C. Utilities and Prices

The flow-value equations are

\[
\begin{align*}
    rV_b &= -\kappa V_b + \sum_{i=1}^{2} \lambda \mu_{si} (V_{\ell i} - p_i - V_b) \\
    rV_{\ell i} &= \delta + x - y + \kappa (V_{\ell i} - V_{\ell i}) + \nu_i \mu_{bo} (V_{\ell i} - V_{\ell i}) \\
    rV_{ns i} &= \delta + x - y + w_i + \kappa (V_{ns i} - V_{ns i}) + \kappa (V_{ns i} - V_{ns i}) + \lambda \mu_{si} (V_{ns i} - V_{ns i}) \\
    rV_{ns i} &= \delta + x - y + w_i + \kappa (C_i - V_{ns i}) + \kappa (V_{ns i} - V_{ns i}) \\
    rV_{\ell i} &= \delta - y + \lambda \mu_{bi} (p_i - V_{\ell i}) \\
    rV_{bo} &= -\kappa V_{bo} + \sum_{i=1}^{2} \nu_i \mu_{\ell i} (V_{\ell i} - V_{bo}) \\
    rV_{si} &= -w_i + \kappa (V_{bo} - V_{si}) - \kappa V_{si} + \lambda \mu_{bi} (V_{bo} + p_i - V_{si}) \\
    rV_{si} &= -\delta + x - y - w_i + \kappa (V_{bo} - C_i - V_{si}) + \kappa (V_{si} - V_{si}) \\
    rV_{\ell i} &= -\delta - y - w_i + \kappa (-C_i - V_{\ell i}) + \lambda \mu_{si} (-p_i - V_{\ell i}),
\end{align*}
\]

where \( C_i \) denotes the cash collateral seized by the lender when the borrower cannot deliver instantly.

The lending fee \( w_i \) is such that the lender receives a fraction \( \theta \in [0, 1] \) of the surplus \( \Sigma_i \) in a repo transaction. Since a repo transaction turns the lender \( \ell i \) into type \( ns i \), the lender’s surplus is \( V_{ns i} - V_{\ell i} \). The borrower’s surplus is \( V_{si} - V_{bo} \) because the borrower \( bo \) becomes a seller \( si \). Therefore, the lending fee is implicitly defined by

\[
V_{ns i} - V_{\ell i} = \theta \Sigma_i = \theta (V_{ns i} - V_{\ell i} + V_{si} - V_{bo} ).
\]

The price is determined by (2). The reservation value of type \( \ell \) is \( \Delta_{\ell} = V_{\ell i} - V_{\ell i} \) because after buying the asset, \( \ell \) becomes a lender \( \ell i \). The reservation value of type \( si \) is \( \Delta_{si} = V_{si} \) because after selling the asset, \( si \) exits the market with utility zero. Substituting in (2), we find

\[
p_i = \phi V_{si} + (1 - \phi) (V_{\ell i} - V_{\ell i} ).
\]

To show existence of symmetric and asymmetric equilibria, we proceed as follows. Given short-selling decisions \( \{\nu_i\}_{i=1,2} \), online Appendix B determines uniquely types’ measures \( \{\mu_\tau\}_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}} \). Given
short-selling decisions and types’ measures, online Appendix C shows that the linear system of (C1)-(C12) determines uniquely the lending fees \( \{w_i\}_{i=1,2} \), prices \( \{p_i\}_{i=1,2} \), and short-selling surpluses \( \{\Sigma_i\}_{i=1,2} \). What is left to show is that agents’ trading strategies (i.e., buying, selling, borrowing, and lending decisions) are optimal, and that buyers’ and sellers’ reservation values are ordered as in (1). Proofs for these results, as well as for the remaining propositions, are in online Appendix D.
References


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Table I: Types of High-Valuation Agent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buyer</td>
<td>( \overline{b} )</td>
<td>Fresh entrant; seeks to buy an asset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lender</td>
<td>( \overline{\ell_i} )</td>
<td>Has bought asset ( i ); seeks to lend it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seller</td>
<td>( \overline{s_i} )</td>
<td>Has bought asset ( i ); seeks to sell it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-searcher; repo counterparty</td>
<td>( \overline{s_i} )</td>
<td>Has lent asset ( i ) to agent of type ( s_i )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-searcher; repo counterparty</td>
<td>( \overline{n_i} )</td>
<td>Has lent asset ( i ) to agent of type ( n_i )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-searcher; repo counterparty</td>
<td>( \overline{b_i} )</td>
<td>Has lent asset ( i ) to agent of type ( b_i )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table II: Types of Low-Valuation Agent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borrower</td>
<td>$bo$</td>
<td>Fresh entrant; seeks to borrow an asset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seller</td>
<td>$si$</td>
<td>Has borrowed asset $i$; seeks to sell it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-searcher</td>
<td>$ni$</td>
<td>Has sold asset $i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyer</td>
<td>$bi$</td>
<td>Has sold asset $i$; seeks to buy it back and deliver to lender</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table III: Parameter Values used in the Calibration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of assets</td>
<td>$I$</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply of each asset</td>
<td>$S$</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flow of high-valuation investors</td>
<td>$F$</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flow of low-valuation investors</td>
<td>$\tilde{F}$</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switching intensity of high-valuation investors</td>
<td>$\pi$</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switching intensity of low-valuation investors</td>
<td>$\kappa$</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact intensity in spot market</td>
<td>$\lambda$</td>
<td>$10^6$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact intensity in repo market</td>
<td>$\nu$</td>
<td>$7.5 \times 10^4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargaining power of a buyer</td>
<td>$\phi$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargaining power of a lender</td>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riskless rate</td>
<td>$r$</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dividend rate</td>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedging benefit of high-valuation investors</td>
<td>$\pi$</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedging benefit of low-valuation investors</td>
<td>$\tilde{\pi}$</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of risk bearing</td>
<td>$y$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table IV: Calibration Results: Search Times and Turnover.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average time to sell asset 1</td>
<td>$1/(\lambda \mu_{b1})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average time to buy asset 1</td>
<td>$1/(\lambda \mu_{s1})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average time to sell asset $i \in {2,\ldots,I}$</td>
<td>$1/(\lambda \mu_{bi})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average time to buy asset $i \in {2,\ldots,I}$</td>
<td>$1/(\lambda \mu_{si})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average time to borrow asset 1</td>
<td>$1/(\lambda \mu_{b1})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average time to lend asset 1</td>
<td>$1/(\lambda \mu_{b2})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time to turn over stock of asset 1</td>
<td>$S/(\lambda \mu_{b1} \mu_{s1})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time to turn over stock of asset $i \in {2,\ldots,I}$</td>
<td>$S/(\lambda \mu_{bi} \mu_{si})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume of asset 1 vs. aggregate of assets $i \in {2,\ldots,I}$</td>
<td>$(\lambda \mu_{bi} \mu_{s1})/(I-1) \lambda \mu_{bi} \mu_{si}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repo agreements for asset 1 relative to issue size</td>
<td>$\mu_{n1}/S$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table V: Calibration Results: Prices and Lending Fees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expected return of asset 1</td>
<td>$\delta/p_1$ 5.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected return of asset $i \in {2, \ldots, I}$</td>
<td>$\delta/p_i$ 6.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread</td>
<td>$\delta/p_i - \delta/p_1$ 50bps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialness</td>
<td>$w_1/p_1$ 35bps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Life-cycle. No Short-Sales, Search Spot Market.
Figure 2: Life-cycles. Figure 3 magnifies the two repo boxes.
Figure 3: The states of a lender and a borrower within a repo contract.
Notes

1 For US evidence, see also Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Krishnamurthy (2002), Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath (2005), and Strebulaev (2007). For Japan, see Mason (1987), Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1991), and Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1993).

2 On liquidity, Sundaresan (2002) reports that trading volume of on-the-run bonds is about ten times larger than that of off-the-run, and Fleming (2002) reports that bid-ask spreads of off-the-run bills are about five times larger than when the bills are on-the-run. Specialness is measured by comparing a bond’s repo rate, which is the interest rate on a loan collateralized by the bond, to the general collateral rate, which is the highest quoted repo rate. Duffie (1996) reports an average specialness of 66bps for on-the-run bonds and 26bps for their off-the-run counterparts.

3 In the US, inter-dealer trading is conducted through brokers. Some brokers operate automated trading systems, structured as electronic limit-order books. Other brokers, however, operate voice-based systems in which orders are negotiated over the phone. Barclay, Hendershott, and Kotz (2006) report that automated systems account for about 85% of trading volume for on-the-run bonds, but the situation is reversed for off-the-run bonds. To explain this phenomenon, they propose a search-based model.

4 The delivery constraint is standard in repo markets: lenders insist on receiving back the same asset they lent because of considerations of book-keeping, capital-gains taxes, etc. The prevalence of the delivery constraint is illustrated by the incidence of short-squeezes, whereby short-sellers have difficulty delivering the asset they borrowed and the asset’s specialness in the repo market increases dramatically. For a description of short-squeezes see, for example, Dupont and Sack (1999).

5 Our multiple-equilibria view seems to fit the Japanese government-bond market: Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1991) and Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1993) show that the benchmark bond in which liquidity concentrates can be arbitrary.

6 Empirical studies by Cornell and Shapiro (1989), Jordan and Jordan (1997), Buraschi and Menini (2002), Krishnamurthy (2002), Graveline and McBrady (2007), and Moulton (2004) show that on-the-run bond prices contain specialness premia consistent with Duffie (1996) and our model. We return to these studies in Section IV.

7 See also Burdett and O’Hara (1987) and Keim and Madhavan (1996) for search-theoretic models.
of block trading in the upstairs market.

8See also Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) for a general analysis of the coexistence of markets, and Economides and Siow (1988) for a spatial model of market formation. See also Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) for models where trading is concentrated in a specific time or location because of asymmetric information.

9Hedgers in the Treasury market can be, for example, dealers in corporate bonds or mortgage-backed securities, who need to hedge the interest-rate risk of their inventories. For a discussion of hedging in the Treasury market, see Dupont and Sack (1999).

10See Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2007) for a similar derivation.

11The price differences in these papers compensate buyers for the difficulty in locating an asset. Suppose, for example, that asset 2 is harder to locate than asset 1. Then, no buyer will search for asset 2 if its price is greater or equal than asset 1’s. If, however, searching for asset 2 does not preclude a simultaneous search for asset 1, price differences disappear (as shown in Proposition 2).

12Our analysis assumes that the only delivery method is to buy the asset in the spot market. An alternative method is through the repo market: short-sellers could borrow the asset from a new lender and deliver it to the original one. (This method is relevant only when short-sellers wish to maintain the short position and it is the lender who needs to sell.) One could argue that the ease of delivering an asset has to do with the repo market, and not with transaction costs in the spot market. In our model, however, both assets are equally easy to locate in the repo market because they are in equal supply and thus have the same measure of lenders. Moreover, in practice, while it might be easier to locate an on- rather than an off-the-run bond in the repo market, such differences are perceived to be of secondary importance relative to the corresponding differences in the spot market.

13In this section we take the lender’s strategy as given. We show that the trading strategies of all agents are optimal in Section III.C, where we establish existence of equilibrium.

14This assumption is for simplicity. An alternative assumption is that the borrower can search for the asset under a late-delivery penalty, but this would not change the basic intuitions.

In Appendix C we show that because collateral acts as a transfer, its specific value does not affect any equilibrium variable except the price of the repo contract: high-valuation agents accept to lend their asset for a lower fee if they can seize more collateral. To downplay this effect, we
set the collateral equal to the utility of a seller $\pi_i$. This ensures that upon reverting to average valuation, agent $\pi_i$ is equally well off when receiving the asset (thus becoming a seller $\pi_i$) or the cash collateral.

15Eq. (1) makes the analysis more transparent because it ensures that marginal traders are comparable across assets even in equilibria where short-selling is concentrated in one asset.

16The outcome where all meetings result in the price given by (2) can be generated as an equilibrium of a bargaining game where the buyer and the seller make simultaneous offers. If the offers generate a set of mutually acceptable prices, then trade occurs at the mid-point of that set. Otherwise, the meeting ends and agents return to the search pool. If the buyer’s strategy is to offer $p_i$, then the seller’s best response is also to ask $p_i$—a higher ask would preclude trade while a lower ask would lower the transaction price. Likewise, if the seller offers $p_i$, then bidding $p_i$ is optimal for the buyer. Obviously any $p_i \in [\Delta\overline{\pi}, \Delta\underline{\pi}]$ is an equilibrium. We do not select among these, but instead treat the parameter $\phi$ as exogenous.

17More precisely, we assume that $\lambda$ and $\nu$ go to $\infty$, holding the ratio $n \equiv \nu / \lambda$ constant. When taking this limit, we say that a variable $Z$ is asymptotically equal to $z_1 / \lambda + z_2 / \nu$, if $Z = z_1 / \lambda + z_2 / (n\lambda) + o(1/\lambda)$.

18Consistent with Amihud and Mendelson, the liquidity discount $\kappa \pi / (\lambda m_b r)$ is the PV of transaction costs incurred by a sequence of marginal buyers. Indeed, a high-valuation investor (the marginal buyer) reverts to average valuation at rate $\kappa$. He then incurs an opportunity cost $\pi$ of holding the asset, since he does not realize the hedging benefit, until he meets a new buyer at rate $\lambda m_b$.

19This logic does not apply to buyers because the marginal buyers are the high-valuation agents who are not limited to the seller pool of a specific asset.

20In the proof of Proposition 10 we show that the strategy is unprofitable under the weaker condition $p_1 - p_2 < w_1 / r + \xi$, for some transaction cost $\xi$ of establishing the arbitrage position. The cost $\xi$ arises because it is not possible to set up the two legs of the position simultaneously given the Poisson arrival of trading opportunities.

21This holds even when in the limit when search frictions go to zero since the contact rate of borrowers converges to the finite limit $g_{bo}$.
Our analysis has an interesting similarity to Krishnamurthy (2002), who assumes that $p_1 - p_2 = v + zw_1/r$, where $v$ is a “liquidity benefit” of on-the-run bonds, and $z < 1$ is the extent to which bond holders can exploit the specialness premium. In our setting, $v$ is the liquidity premium and $z$ is determined by the lenders’ search times.

One might argue that because of same-day settlement in the repo market, some sophisticated investors can manage to lend their asset almost continuously, i.e., $z \approx 1$. We conjecture that in a model with heterogenous lenders, the less sophisticated ones would have a lower reservation value for owning the asset and hence could be the “marginal buyers” in the spot market. The parameter $z$ could then be significantly different than one, reflecting marginal buyers’ inferior lending ability.

Eqs. (12) and (13) ensure that arbitrage portfolios are suboptimal for arbitrageurs, i.e., average-valuation agents with no initial position. They do not apply, however, to average-valuation agents with “inherited” positions. Consider, for example, a low-valuation agent with a short position in asset 1, who reverts to average valuation. The agent can unwind the short position by trading with a seller of asset 1, but might also accept to trade with a seller of asset 2. This would hedge the short position, lowering the cost of waiting for a seller of asset 1. In our analysis, we rule out such strategies by assuming that arbitrage portfolios can be held only by arbitrageurs. This is partly for simplicity, to keep agents’ life-cycles manageable. One could also argue that many investors do not engage in such strategies because of costs to managing multiple positions, settlement costs, etc. (These costs could be smaller for sophisticated arbitrageurs.) Needless to say, it would be desirable to relax this assumption.

An agent’s expected search time is the inverse of the Poisson intensity of arrival of counterparties. Thus, for a buyer of asset $i$ it is $1/(\lambda \mu_{si})$, and for a seller it is $1/(\lambda \mu_{bi})$.

The drop in repo-market volume is less drastic, but this might be because not all repo transactions are initiated for short-selling purposes. For example, some transactions are initiated by institutions whose main goal is to lend cash rather than borrow an asset.

Empirical studies generally document a decreasing relationship between supply and specialness or on-the-run premia. Cornell and Shapiro (1989) and Jordan and Jordan (1997) provide case studies where large price premia were generated by a short-squeeze or a large investor’s unwillingness to lend, respectively. Krishnamurthy (2002) finds that on-the-run premia are negatively related to issue size, and Graveline and McBrady (2007) and Moulton (2004) find a negative relationship between issue size and specialness.
27For example, on February 2, 2005, primary dealers reported asset loans of about $2 trillion (New York Fed website, www.ny.frb.org/markets/gsds/search.cfm). Since the Treasury market is worth about $4 trillion, of which 5% are on-the-run bonds, the amount of repo agreements exceeds the market value of on-the-run bonds by about 2/(4 × 5%) = 10. We select a number below ten to account for repo activity in off-the-run bonds. A higher number would strengthen our results because the lending fee would increase.

28Suppose, for example, that the average Treasury security turns over in twelve trading days. Since on-the-run bonds account for about 5% of market capitalization and 10/11 of trading volume, they turn over in 5% × 12/(10/11) = 0.66 days, while off-the-run bonds turn over in 95% × 12/(1/11) = 125.4 days.

29The six-day expected horizon of short-sellers is approximately equal to the turnover time of the asset supply that they generate (F/κ). This supply is about seven times the issue size S, and turns over seven times more slowly.

30US Treasury securities are traded round the clock in New York, London, and Tokyo. However, Fleming (1997) reports that 94% of the trading takes place in New York from 7:30am to 5:30pm.

31The search times in Table IV appear especially short if we consider the implied transaction costs. For example, the cost incurred by a high-valuation buyer is not to receive the hedging benefit x while searching. With a search time of 0.12 days, i.e., 0.12/250 of a year, the search cost is a fraction x × (0.12/250)/(1/6.44%) = 1.2 × 10^{-5} of the price, i.e., 0.12 cents per $100 transaction value. Likewise, the search cost of a low-valuation agent seeking to borrow asset 1 in the repo market is not to receive the hedging benefit x. This cost is a fraction x × (0.07/250)/(1/6.44%) = 2.9 × 10^{-5} of the price, i.e., 0.29 cents per $100 transaction value. Such costs are smaller than the average bid-ask spread in the Treasury market, which is 1.1 cent (Dupont and Sack (1999)).

32Matching the risk premium of long-term bonds is only one condition, while there are two parameters (x, y). The second degree of freedom in these parameters appears to have a small effect on the calibration results.

33Some studies find smaller effects. For example, Fleming (2003) reports that on-the-run bonds yield 5.6bps below off-the-run bonds, and Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath (2005) report 1.5bps. These papers, however, focus on bonds with a long time to maturity, for which the three-month convenience yield of being on-the-run has only a small effect on the yield to maturity. Warga (1992)
compares the returns of on- and off-the-run bond portfolios rather than their yields to maturity. This isolates the on-the-run convenience yield in exactly the same way as in this paper. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) compare yields to maturity, but can isolate the convenience yield because they focus on securities with very short times to maturity. They find that Treasury bills maturing in less than six months yield 38bps below comparable Treasury notes.

The expected return spread $\delta/p_i - \delta/p_1$ in Table V is greater than the lending fee $w_1/p_1$. This suggests an arbitrage strategy of shorting $\$1$ of asset 1, paying the lending fee, and buying $\$1$ of asset 2. The payoff of this strategy is risky, however, because the assets are held in different quantities. Adjusting for risk amounts to calculating the marginal utility flow $$(\delta - y)/p_i - (\delta - y)/p_1 - w_1/p_1$$ that an arbitrageur would derive, which turns out to be negative.