

GAME THEORY. Third Edition

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There is also a companion book that contains an additional set of 180 fully solved exercises for Chapters 2-7 (a similar companion book for Chapters 8-16 is in preparation).

For details see: http://faculty.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/bonanno/GT_Book.html

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