| # | Name | Duration (mins) |
TOPICS | LINK | |
| 1 (Chapter 2 of textbook) |
1 | 01A | 30 | Split or Steal, Difference between
Game-Frame and Game First mention of strict/weak dominance |
https://youtu.be/y90km53pGMA |
| 2 | 01B | 48 | Example of 3-player game. Strict/weak dominance. Second-price auction | https://youtu.be/yRSk2Frynts | |
| 3 | 01C | 47 | IDSDS and IDWDS procedures. Nash equilibrium. | https://youtu.be/W5Rua3MsC8A | |
| 4 | 01D | 27 | The grade-request game. Example of auction with coin toss for tie breaking. Risk neutrality. | https://youtu.be/EAMg4gQ-4ZA | |
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| 2 (Chapter 3 of textbook) |
5 | 02A | 23 | Ultimatum game
with various preferences. Centipede game with various preferences |
https://youtu.be/MuRnwMywP9A |
| 6 | 02B | 30 | More PI games: divorce game, race to 38, Selten's Chain-store game. |
https://youtu.be/9lBE7kmkLiY | |
| 7 | 02C | 46 | End of PI games: multiple BI, strategy, relationship between BI and NE |
https://youtu.be/nbBfORtT1MQ | |
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| 3 (Chapter 4 of textbook) |
8 | 03A | 36 | Imperfect information. Strategies. Strategic form associated with imperfect information game. | https://youtu.be/2A7rD_yJYH8 |
| 9 | 03B | 24 | Games with chance moves. Risk neutrality again. | https://youtu.be/LYjFylFatlw | |
| The opening slide says "Video # 8" but it is actually Video # 9. Error in this video (03B), about 16min20sec: in the calculation for (AB, C), I wrote 4* 1/2 + 12 * 3/4 = 11 whereas it should have been 1/4 * 4 + 3/4 *12 = 10. | |||||
| 10 | 03C | 31 | Subgames and subgame-perfect equilibrium. | https://youtu.be/n9oKeRynZI4 | |
| 11 | 03D | 30 | More on SPE: existence, multiplicity, when = NE | https://youtu.be/wcptDXDeX2E | |
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| 4 (Chapter 5 of textbook) |
12 | 04A | 34 | Uncertainty in games. Expected Utility Theorem 1 | https://youtu.be/UG9LJr8DMcw |
| 13 | 04B | 60 | Expected Utility Theorem 2.
Normalization. Examples of games. |
https://youtu.be/IkG1a7F_oX8 | |
| There is an error in Example 2 in video 13 (04B), about 7 minutes in. There are two equivalent ways of fixing it: either change B > A into A > B and then all the calculations are correct, or keep B > A but then reverse the inequality from a+c > 2b to a+c<2b. What the calculations show is that A is better than B if and only if C is better than D (alternatively, B is better than A if and only if D is better than C). | |||||
| 14 | 04C | 26 | Money lotteries and attitudes to risk. | https://youtu.be/L_3Ky7OqEfM | |
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| 5 (Chapters 6 and 7 of textbook) |
15 | 05A | 44 | Mixed-strategy extension/Nash equilibrium | https://youtu.be/MOsPW3fL_h4 |
| 16 | 05B | 35 | More on mixed-strategy equilibria | https://youtu.be/9IaqrOXsChQ | |
| In video 16 (05B), at around the 5 min mark, there is a typo: it says that if Player 1 switches to C then his payoff increases from 2 to 4, when in fact it increases from 3 to 4. | |||||
| 17 | 05C | 32 | Behavioral strategies. SPE when payoffs are cardinal | https://youtu.be/JVy8ZwL1bA8 | |
| 18 | 05D | 31 | More on SPE in cardinal games | https://youtu.be/iq1THIeYABM | |
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| 6 (Chapters 9, 11, and 12 of textbook) |
19 | 06A | 36 | Problems with SPE. Assessments,
sequential rationality and reachable information sets |
https://youtu.be/5Ipl9MnNXIk |
| In video 19 (06A), at around the 30 min mark, both D and E were highlighted, but E was highlighted in error (it has probability zero): only D should have been highlighted. | |||||
| 20 | 06B | 39 | Bayes' rule | https://youtu.be/bXTfp_vIbuY | |
| 21 | 06C | 39 | Back to Weak Sequential Equilibrium. | https://youtu.be/W-R1EZZdReQ | |
| 22 | 06D | 45 | How to find WSE | https://youtu.be/KIJS-ESLMXQ | |
| In video 22 (06D), at minute 20 I say and write that T is not sequentially rational (at the left node), whereas I should have said and written that B is not sequentially rational. | |||||
| 23 | 06E | 46 | Sequential equilibrium | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CFisHg46pkw | |
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| 7 (Chapter 8 of textbook) |
24 | 07A | 18 | The story of the 3 hats | https://youtu.be/qh4aF2dGlJA |
| 25 | 07B | 33 | Individual knowledge | https://youtu.be/FRZVCpc5lFQ |
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| There is an error in video 24 (07B) at minute 30:16. After (correctly) writing that KF = {c,d,e} I wrote that notKF (that is, the complement of KF) is {a,b,c} while obviously it is {a,b}. This mistake was corrected later at minute 31:32. | |||||
| 26 | 07C | 55 | Interactive knowledge | https://youtu.be/fTKqrMe2BU0 | |
| There is an error in video 25 (07C) at minute12:20 I say "singleton h", meaning to say "singleton d", and then I proceed to correctly write "d". | |||||
| 27 | 07D | 43 | Common knowledge | https://youtu.be/OS5jtvMlIOc | |
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| 8 (Chapter 14 of textbook) |
28 | 08A | 50 | One-sided incomplete information in static games | https://youtu.be/5bpFrz1ipsg |
| 29 | 08B | 38 | Two-sided incomplete information. Common prior | https://youtu.be/8XC6_aeRZ0A | |
| 30 | 08C | 40 | More on two-sided incomplete information | https://youtu.be/eWJBpR6QSBo | |
| 31 | 08D | 75 | Dynamic games of incomplete information | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PlEOHUlas0 | |
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