In case of ties Player 1 is the winner.

bidding \$100 equivalent to bidding \$150 OUTCOME:

Show only the payoffs of Player 1

	Player 2							
	\$5 0	\$100	\$150	\$200	\$250			
\$50	100	0	0	0	0			
Player → \$100	100	50	0	0	Ð			
1 → \$150	100	50	٥	D	Ð			
(v,=150) \$200	100	50	0	-50	0			
\$25 0	100	50	D	- 50	- 100			

In case of ties Player 1 is the winner.

Show only the **payoffs of Player 1**



IDSDS. The Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies



		Player 2								
		D	D		E		F			
	A	8	6	0	9	3	8			
Player 1	B	3	2	2	1	4	3			
	С	2	8	1	5	3	1			

IDSDS. The Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies

IDWDS. The Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies







IDWDS. The Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies :



- at every stage mark all the strategies of all Mu players Mar are weakly br strictly dominated.
 then delete Men all in Me same step
 - · repeat in the Smaller game



B weakly dominated by A D wearly " by C

aes, besz Nash equilibrium (a,b) is a N.E. if (1) $\Pi_1(a,b) \geq \Pi_1(x,b) \quad \forall x \in S_1$ (2) $\Pi_2(a,b) \ge \Pi_2(a,y) \forall y \in S_2$ yer 2 Player FD EBest reply Function 23 3 1 Player A 1 D or Pluyer 1: BR₁: $S_2 \rightarrow 2^{S_1}$ 4 1 5 В 33 1 $BR_2(A) = \{\xi\}$ 32 0 3 C1 BR2 (B) = 3E3 1.5 $BR_1(b) = SB_1c3$ (C, D) is a N.E. $BR_2(c) = \{D\}$ $BR_{I}(E) = \{A\}$ (A,E) " $BR_{I}(F) = \{B\}$



Player 3 chooses F



 $S_1 = \{A, B\}$ $S_2 = \{C, D\}$ $S_3 = \{F, G\}$ $N \cdot E_1 : (A, D, F)$

Large game.

150 students in a class, they simultaneously ask for a grade (A, B or C); if 20% or less (i.e. \leq 30) ask for an A then all requests are granted, otherwise they all get a C.

Nach equilibria: • everybody request an A • 32 or more request A • exactly 30 request an A and the others request B ISO! IZO! 30!