




		2	
		L	R
1	T	0, 6	9, 18
	B	9, 6	0, 0

		2	
		L	R
1	T	18, 6	0, 18
	B	9, 6	9, 0

1: α

β

2: $\alpha \quad \frac{2}{3} \qquad \frac{1}{3} \quad \beta$

↑
true state

		2	
		L	R
1	T	0, 6	9, 18
	B	9, 6	0, 0


		2	
		L	R
1	T	18, 6	0, 18
	B	9, 6	9, 0



1: α


β

2: $\alpha \quad 2/3 \quad 1/3 \quad \beta$


↑
true state







↑
true
state



		2	
		L	R
1	T	0, 6	9, 18
	B	9, 6	0, 0


		2	
		L	R
1	T	18, 6	0, 18
	B	9, 6	9, 0

1: α

β

2: $\alpha \quad \frac{2}{3} \quad \frac{1}{3} \quad \beta$

↑
true state



Nash equilibria:

(BT, L)

and

(TB, R)

		2	
		L	R
1	T	0, 6	9, 18
	B	9, 6	0, 0

		2	
		L	R
1	T	18, 6	0, 18
	B	9, 6	9, 0


1: α



β

2: $\alpha \frac{2}{3} \quad \frac{1}{3} \beta$

↑
true state

How to interpret the Nash equilibria. E.g. (TB, R)







1:



2:




↑
true state



1:



α



β

2:



G_1

		2	
		C	D
1	A	1, 1	0, 3
	B	0, 1	3, 0


G_2

		2	
		C	D
1	A	1, 3	0, 1
	B	0, 0	3, 1

G_3

		2	
		C	D
1	A	0, 3	3, 1
	B	2, 0	0, 1

1:



2:




 true state

1:

$$a \quad 2/3 \quad 1/3 \quad \mathbf{b}$$

$$c$$

2:

$$a$$

$$\mathbf{b} \quad 1/4 \quad c \quad 3/4$$

		2	
		C	D
1	A	1, 1	0, 3
	B	0, 1	3, 0


		2	
		C	D
1	A	1, 3	0, 1
	B	0, 0	3, 1

		2	
		C	D
1	A	0, 3	3, 1
	B	2, 0	0, 1


1: a $2/3$ $1/3$ b c

2: a b $1/4$ c $3/4$


↑
true state




NATURE



Suppose that Player 1's pure strategy involves playing A at his left information set.



Thus Player 1's pure strategy must involve playing *B* at his left information set.



Thus Player 1's pure strategy must involve playing B at his left information set.

One more example: different payoffs from previous one

		2	
		C	D
1	A	1,3	0,1
	B	0,0	3,1


		2	
		C	D
1	A	1,3	0,1
	B	0,0	3,1


		2	
		C	D
1	A	1,0	0,2
	B	0,0	3,1

1: a b c


2: a b c

↑
true state





Case 1: Player 2's choice at her left information set is C.



Case 2: Player 2's choice at her left information set is D .