Giacomo Bonanno
Working Papers

Giacomo Bonanno and Elias Tsakas,    Qualitative analysis of common belief of rationality in strategic-form games.


We study common belief of rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a model of qualitative beliefs. We characterize the three main solution concepts for such games, viz., Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS), Iterated Deletion of Boergers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP), by means of gradually restrictive properties imposed on the models of qualitative beliefs. As a corollary, we prove that IDIP refines IDBS, which refines IDSDS.

  To download the file in pdf format click hereQualitative.pdf

Giacomo Bonanno,    Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction.


Doxastic characterizations of the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes and of the set of backward-induction outcomes are provided for general perfect-information games (where there may be multiple backward-induction solutions). We use static models that are behavioral, rather than strategy-based, where a state only specifies the actual play of the game and not the hypothetical choices of the players at nodes that are not reached by the actual play. The analysis is completely free of counterfactuals and no belief revision theory is required, since only the beliefs at reached histories are specified..                        

  To download the file in pdf format click hereNEBI.pdf

Giacomo Bonanno,   Two lectures on the epistemic foundations of game theory.


These are the slides of  two lectures on the Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory, delivered at the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), February 8, 2007.

                             To download the files in pdf format click here: Lecture 1.pdfLecture 2.pdf

 Giacomo Bonanno (with Klaus Nehring),   Agreeing to disagree: a survey.

                             To download the paper in pdf format click here: agree.pdf

Some of the material in this paper was published in: Giacomo Bonanno and Klaus Nehring, “How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information", International Journal of Game Theory, 28 (3), August 1999, pp. 409-434 (To download the paper in pdf format click here: common.pdf)