**The Unawareness ****Biblio****graphy**

If you want to have your work included or something needs updating, please email me.

Conferences

International Workshop on 'Unawareness', January 29-30, 2014, University of Queensland, Organizer: Simon Grant, Jeff Kline, and John Quiggin

Unawareness: Conceptualization and Modeling, October 29, 2011, Johns Hopkins University, Organizer: Edi Karni

Papers

Agotnes, T. and N. Alechina (2007). Full and relative awareness: A decidable logic for reasoning about knowledge of unawareness, in: D. Samet (Ed.), Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2007), Presses Universitaires De Louvain, 6-14.

Auster, S. (2013). Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard,

Games and Economic Behavior, 82, 503-521.van Benthem, J. and Velazquez-Quesada, F.R. (2010). The dynamic of awareness, Synthese, 177, 5-27.

Board, O. and K.S. Chung (2011). Object-based unawareness: Axioms, an earlier version published in: G. Bonanno, W. van der Hoek, and M. Woolridge (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory, Texts in Logic and Games, Amsterdam University Press.

Board, O. and K.S. Chung (2011). Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications, mimeo., University of Minnesota.

Board, O., Chung, K.S., and B. C. Schipper (2011). Two models of unawareness: Comparing the object-based and subjective-state-space approaches,

Synthese, 179, 13-34.Chang, C. and S.H. Liu (2011). Unawareness and the standard-state space models, mimeo., National Tsing Hua University.

Chen, Y.C., Ely, J., and X. Luo (2012). Note on unawareness: Negative introspection versus au introspection

(and ku introspection), International Journal of Game Theory, 41, 325-329.Chen, Y.J. and X.J. Zhao (2013). Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions, Games, 4, 508-531.

Copic, J. and A. Galeotti (2007). Awareness Equilibrium, mimeo., University of Essex.

Cozic, M. (2011). Probablistic unawareness, mimeo., Universite Paris-Est Creteil Va-de-Marne

Dekel, E., Lipman, B., and A. Rustichini (1998). Standard state-space models preclude unawareness,

Econometrica, 66, 159-173.Diaye, M.A. and D. Schoch (2007). A generalized state space for unawareness, mimeo.

van Ditmarsch, H. and T. French (2009). Awareness and forgetting of facts and agents, in: P. Boldi and G. Vizzari and G. Pasi and R. Baeza-Yates (Eds.), Proceedings of WI-IAT Workshops 2009, IEEE Press, 478-483. (Workshop WLIAMAS.)

van Ditmarsch, H. and T. French (2011). Becoming aware of propositional variables, in: M. Banerjee and A. Seth (Eds.), ICLA 2011, LNAI 6521, Springer, 204-218.

van Ditmarsch, H. and T. French (2011). On the interactions of awareness and certainty, in: D. Wang and M. Reynolds (Eds.), Proceedings of 24th Australasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AI 11), LNCS 7106, Springer, 727-738.

van Ditmarsch, H., French, T., and F.R. Velazquez-Quesada (2012). Action models for knowledge and awareness. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Miltiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012), 1091-1098.

van Ditmarsch, H., French, T., Velazquez-Quesada, F. R., and Y. N. Wang (2013). Knowledge, awareness, and bisimulation, in: B. C. Schipper (Ed.), Proceedings of 14th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2013), ACM, 61-70.

Ely, J. (1998). A note on unawareness, mimeo., Northwestern University.

Fagin, R. and J. Halpern (1988). Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning,

Artificial Intelligence, 34, 39-76.Fang, Y.H. (2011). Games with and without unawareness, mimeo., University of Chicago.

Feinberg, Y. (2004). Subjective reasoning - games with unawareness, mimeo., Stanford University.

Feinberg, Y. (2005). Games with incomplete awareness, mimeo., Stanford University.

Feinberg, Y. (2011). Strategic communication, in: K.R. Apt (Ed.), Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2011), ACM, 1-11.

Feinberg, Y. (2012). Games with unawareness, mimeo., Stanford University.

Filiz-Ozbay, E. (2012). Incorporating unawareness into contract theory,

Games and Economic Behavior, 76, 181-194.Franke, M. (2013). Pragmatic reasoning about unawareness,

Erkenntnis, forthcoming.Franke, M. and T. de Jager (2007). The relevance of awareness, Proceedings of the 16th Amsterdam Colloqium, 97-102.

Franke, M. and T. de Jager (2008). Now that you mention it: Awareness Dynamics in Discourse and Decisions, mimeo., University of Amsterdam.

Galanis, S. (2011). Syntactic foundation for unawareness of theorems,

Theory and Decision, 71, 593-614.Galanis, S. (2013). Unawareness of theorems, Economic Theory, 52, 41-73.

Galanis, S. (2013). The value of information under unawareness, mimeo., University of Southampton.

Geanakoplos, J. (1989). Game theory without partitions and applications to speculation and consensus, mimeo., Yale University.

Grant, S. and J. Quiggin (2008). Bounded rationality and small worlds, mimeo., Rice University.

Grant, S. and J. Quiggin (2013). Inductive reasoning about unawareness,

Grant, S. and J. Quiggin (2013). Bounded awareness, heuristics, and the Precautionary principle, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 93, 17-31.Economic Theory, 54, 717-755.

Grant, S. and J. Quiggin (2014). A preference model for choice subject to surprise, mimeo., University of Queensland.Grant, S., Kline, J. J., and J. Quiggin (2012). Differential awareness, ambiguity, and incomplete contracts: A model of contractual disputes, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 82, 494-504.

Grant, S., Kline, J.J., O'’Callaghan, P., and J. Quiggin (2014). Sub-models for Interactive Unawareness, mimeo., University of Queensland.

Grossi, D. and F.R. Velazquez-Quesada (2009). Twelve angry men: A study on the fine-gain of announcements, in: X. He, J. Horty, and E. Pacuit (Eds.), LORI 2009, LNAI 5834, Springer, 147-160.Halpern, J. (2001). Alternative semantics for unawareness,

Games and Economic Behavior, 37, 321-339.Halpern, J. and L. C. Rego (2008). Interactive unawareness revisited,

Games and Economic Behavior, 62, 232-262.Halpern, J. and L. C. Rego (2009). Reasoning about knowledge of unawareness,

Games and Economic Behavior, 67, 503-525.Halpern, J. and L. C. Rego (2013). Reasoning about knowledge of unawareness revisited, Mathematical Social Sciences, 66, 73-84.

Halpern, J. and L. C. Rego (2014). Extensive games with possibly unaware players, Mathematical Social Sciences, forthcoming.

Heifetz, A., Meier, M., and B. C. Schipper (2003). Multiperson unawareness, in: J. Y. Halpern (Ed.), Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2003), 148-158.

Heifetz, A., Meier, M., and B. C. Schipper (2006). Interactive unawareness,

Journal of Economic Theory, 130, 78-94.Heifetz, A., Meier, M., and B. C. Schipper (2008). A canonical model of interactive unawareness,

Games and Economic Behavior,62, 304-324.Heifetz, A., Meier, M., and B. C. Schipper (2005/2013). Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade,

Games and Economic Behavior,77, 100-121. Prior version with the universal type spaceHeifetz, A., Meier, M., and B. C. Schipper (2007/2013). Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior,

Games and Economic Behavior, 81, 50-68.

Heifetz, A., Meier, M., and B. C. Schipper (2007/2011). Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games, mimeo., The University of California, Davis.

Heinsalu, S. (2012). Equivalence of the information structure with unawareness to the logic of awareness, Journal of Economic Theory, 147, 2453-2468.

Heinsalu, S. (2014). Universal type structures with unawareness,

Games and Economic Behavior, 83, 255-266.

Hill, B. (2007). The Logic of Awareness Change, Proceedings of ILCLI International Worskop on Logic and Philosophy of Knowledge, Communication and Action, University of the Basque Country Press.

Hill, B. (2010). Awareness dynamics,

Journal of Philosophical Logic, 39, 113-137.Hill, B. (2013). Awareness and equilibrium,

Synthese, 190, 851-869.Huang, Z.S. and K. Kwast (1991). Awareness, negation and logical omniscience, in J. van Eijck (Ed.), Logics in AI, volume 478 of Lectures Notes in Computer Science, pages 282-300, Springer.

Kawamura, E. (2005). Competitive equilibrium with unawareness in economies with production,

Karni, E. and M.-L. Viero (2013). "Reverse Bayesianism": A choice-based theory of growing awareness, American Economic Review, 103, 2790-2810.Journal of Economic Theory, 121, 167-191.

Karni, E. and M.-L. Viero (2013). Probabilistic Sophistication and Reverse Bayesianism, mimeo., Queen's University.

Karni, E. and M.-L. Viero (2014). Awareness of Unawareness: A Theory of Decision Making in the Face of Ignorance, mimeo., Queen's University.Konolige, K. (1986). What awareness isn't: A sentential view of implicit and explicit belief, in: J. Halpern (Ed.), Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning and Knowledge (TARK 1986), Morgan Kaufmann, 241-250.

Li J. (2008a). Modeling unawareness with an arbitrary state space, mimeo., University of Pennsylvania.

Li J. (2008b). A note on unawareness and zero probability, mimeo., University of Pennsylvania.

Li J. (2008c). Interactive knowledge with unawareness, mimeo., University of Pennsylvania.

Li J. (2003/2009). Information structures with unawareness,

Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 977-993.Li J. (2006). Dynamic games of complete information with unawareness, mimeo., University of Pennsylvania.

Li S.X., Peitz, M., and Zhao, X.J. (2012). Vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers, Mathematical Social Sciences, forthcoming.

Liu, Z. (2012). Games with incomplete information when players are partially aware of others' signals, mimeo., University of Buffalo.Liu, Z. (2008). Fair disclosure and investor asymmetric awareness in stock markets, mimeo., University of Buffalo.

Liu, Z. (2008). The Dirty Face Problem with Unawareness,

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 8 (1) (Topics), Article 28.Liu, Z. and Qiu, C. (2011). Consumer unawareness and competitive strategies, mimeo., University of Buffalo.

Meier, M. and B. C. Schipper (2007/2013). Speculative trade under unawareness: The infinite case, mimeo., The University of California, Davis.

Meier, M. and B. C. Schipper (2005/2013). Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection, Economic Theory, forthcoming. old version.

Meier, M. and B. C. Schipper (2007/2011). Conditional dominance in games with unawareness, mimeo., The University of California, Davis. old version

Mengel, F., Tsakas, E., and A. Vostroknukov (2009). Awareness in repeated games, mimeo., Maastricht University.

Mengel, F., Tsakas, E., and A. Vostroknukov (2012). Decision making with imperfect knowledge of the state space, mimeo., Maastricht University.

Modica, S. (2000/2008). Unawareness, priors and posteriors,

Decisions in Economics and Finance, 31, 81-94.Modica, S. and A. Rustichini (1994). Awareness and partitional information structures,

Theory and Decision, 37, 107-124.Modica, S. and A. Rustichini (1999). Unawareness and partitional information structures,

Games and Economic Behavior, 27, 265-298.Modica, S., Rustichini, A., and J.-M. Tallon (1998). Unawareness and bankruptcy: A general equilibrium model,

Economic Theory, 12, 259-292.Montiel Olea, J. L. (2008). A characterization of trivial unawareness, mimeo., ITAM.

Nielsen, C. and A. Sebald (2011). Forward induction, strong beliefs, and unawareness in dynamic psychological games, mimeo., University of Copenhagen.

Nielsen, C. and A. Sebald (2012). Unawareness in dynamic psychological games, mimeo., University of Copenhagen.

Ozbay, E. (2008). Unawareness and strategic announcements in games with uncertainty, mimeo., University of Maryland.

Pinter, M. and Udvari, Z. (2011). Generalized type spaces, mimeo., Corvinus University.

Pires, C. (1994). Do I know Omega? An axiomatic model of awareness and knowledge, mimeo., Universidade de Évora.

Quiggin, J. (2013). The value of information and the value of awareness, mimeo., University of Queensland.

Rego, L. C. and J. Halpern (2012). Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players, International Journal of Game Theory, 41, 131-155.

Sadzik, T. (2006). Knowledge, awareness and probabilistic beliefs, mimeo., Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.

Schipper, B. C. (2013). Awareness-dependent subjective expected utility, International Journal of Game Theory, 42, 725-753.

Schipper, B. C. (2013). Preference-based unawareness, Mathematical Social Sciences, forthcoming.

Schipper, B. C. (2014). Awareness, chapter prepared for the Handbook of Logics for Knowledge and Belief, van Ditmarsch, H., Halpern, J.Y., van der Hoek, W., and B. Kooi (Eds.), College Publications, London, forthcoming.

Schipper, B. C. and H.Y. Woo (2013). Political Awareness, microtargeting of voters and negative electoral campaigning, mimeo., The University of California, Davis.

Seldar, I. (2011). Awareness and the preface paradox, mimeo., Comenius University.

Siddiqi, H. (2014). The financial market consequences of growing awareness: The case of implied volatility skew, mimeo., University of Queensland.

Sillari, G. (2006). Models of awareness, in: G. Bonanno, W. van der Hoek, and M. Woolridge (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th Conference on Logic and the Fundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT 2006), 209-218.

Sillari, G. (2008). Quantified logic of awareness and impossible possible worlds,

Review of Symbolic Logic, 1, 514-529.von Thadden, E.-L. and Zhao X. J. (2012). Incentives for unaware agents, Review of Economic Studies, 79, 1151-1174.

von Thadden, E.-L. and Zhao X. J. (2013). Multitask agency with unawareness, Theory and Decision, forthcoming.

Thijsse, E. (1991). On total awareness logic (with special attention to monotonicity constraints and exibility), in: M. De Rijke (Ed.), Diamond and defaults: Studies in Pure and Applied Intensional Logic, Kluwer, 309-347.

Thijsse, E. and H. Wansing (1996). A fugue on the themes of awareness logic and correspondence, Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 6, 127-136.

Walker, O. (2012). Unawareness with "possible" possible worlds, mimeo., London School of Economics.

Walker, O. and Dietz, S. (2011). A representation result for choice under conscious unawareness, mimeo., London School of Economics.

Wansing, H. (1990). A general possible worlds framework for reasoning about knowledge and belief, Studia Logica, 49, 523-539.

Xiong, S.Y. (2007). Unawareness and the standard state space revised, mimeo., Northwestern University.

Zhao, X.J. (2008). Moral hazard with unawareness,

Rationality and Society, 20, 471-496.Zhao, X.J. (2011). Framing contingencies in contracts,

Mathematical Social Sciences, 61, 31-40.Zhao, X.J. (2013). Strategic mis-selling and pre-contractual cognition, mimeo., Hong Kong University of Science & Technology.

Related PapersAhn, D. and H. Ergin (2010). Framing Contingencies,

Econometrica, 78, 655-695.Al-Najjar, N., Anderlini, L., and L. Felli (2006). Undescribable events, Review of Economic Studies, 73, 849-868.

Anderlini, L. and L. Felli (1994). Incomplete written contracts: Undescribable states of nature,

Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1085-1124.Blume, A. and U. Gneezy (2010). Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: theory and evidence, Games and Economic Behavior, 68, 488-511.

Chung, K.S. and L. Fortnow (2008). Loopholes, mimeo., Northwestern University.

Dekel, E., Lipman, B., and A. Rustichini (1998). Recent developments in modeling unforeseen contingencies,

European Economic Review, 42, 523-542.Dekel, E., Lipman, B., and A. Rustichini (2001). Representing preferences with a unique subjective state space,

Econometrica, 69, 891-934.Devanur, N. R. and L. Fortnow (2009). A computational theory of awareness and decision making, in: A. Heifetz (Ed.), Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2009), 99-107.

Epstein, L., Marinacci, M., and K. Seo (2007). Coarse contingencies and ambiguity,

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Economic Theory, 17, 247--276.Kreps, D. M. (1979). A representation theorem for ‘preference for flexibility’,

Econometrica, 47, 565–577.Kreps, D. M. (1992). Static choice in the presence of unforeseen contingencies, in: P. Dasgupta, D. Gale, O. Hart, and E. Maskin (Eds.), Economic Analysis of Markets and Games: Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 258–281.

Kunimoto, T. (2008). Indescribability and Asymmetric Information at the Contracting Stage,

Economics Letters, 99, 367-370.Kunimoto, T. (2010). Indescribability and Its Irrelevance for Contractual Incompleteness, Review of Economic Design, 14, 271-289.

Lee, J. (2008). Unforeseen contingencies and renegotiation with asymmetric information,

Economic Journal, 118, 678-694.Masatlioglu, Y., Nakajima, D., and Ozbay, E. (2012). Revealed attention, American Economic Review, 102, 2183-2205.

Maskin. E. and J. Tirole (1999). Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts,

Review of Economic Studies, 66, 83-114.Maskin, E. (2002). On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts,

European Economic Review, 46, 725-733.Segal, I. (1999). Complexity and renegotiation: A foundation for incomplete contracts,

Review of Economic Studies, 66, 57-82.Selten, R. (1979). Limited rationality and structural uncertainty, in:

Wittgenstein, The Vienna Circle and Critical Rationalism, Proceedings of the 3rd International Wittgenstein Symposium, 476-483.Sillari, G. (2005). A Logical Framework for Convention,

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American Economic Review,99, 265-294.Zimper, A. (2009). An epistemic model of an agent who does not reflect on reasoning processes, Mathematical Social Sciences, 58, 290-309.

Financial support from the National Science Foundation Grant No. 0647811 is gratefully acknowlegded.

Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.